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ABSTRACT
The involvement of Mental Health Professionals (MHPs) in cases of child sexual abuse
(CSA) is complex and intimidating. There are legal rules and academic suggestions to guide the
MHP in this endeavor, but in experience, these rules and suggestions are lacking. Current
literature and research indicates that there is little if any direct knowledge on how judges
perceive MHPs who testify before them in court. A qualitative phenomenological inquiry that
directly interviewed five judges about their perceptions of MHPs in cases of CSA was
undertaken. The results indicate that MHPs should be more intentional about their choices
regarding involvement in court, more proactive about educating the legal system regarding MHP
involvement, more willing to advocate within the system for the best interest of the child, and
more confident about the significance of MHP involvement in CSA cases.
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
As I began my career in counseling, I was, if not confident, at least reassured in the
knowledge that my education and training would guide me in making the appropriate choices in
situations that involved the abuse of a child. I graduated from law school, passed the bar, got a
Master's Degree in Counseling Psychology, and successfully completed the licensure process for
Licensed Professional Counselors (LPCs). I had the extra benefit of knowledge I had gained
from my mother. My mother worked for more than forty years within the Mississippi
Department of Human Services (MDHS), serving as the Director of Youth and Children Services
in Claiborne, Jefferson, Copiah, Franklin, Adams, Lincoln and Wilkinson Counties at differing
times. I grew up watching my mother fight against this form of maltreatment, and trusted my
training and experience to help me when, or if, I was called into battle to protect a child against
abuse.
Unfortunately, what I found was that I felt woefully underprepared. My ethical
guidelines and learning led me to an awareness that my best course of action would be to refer
the most complicated cases involving child abuse to other more experienced professionals.
Therefore, when I found myself involved with a case in which there was a suspicion that two
preverbal children were being abused, I reported the suspicion of abuse to MDHS, and referred
the children to another mental health professional (MHP), who used the modality of Play
Therapy in her work with children. I continued to work with one parent, however, and came to
1

the realization that no one really knew the best course of action. Numerous professionals
reported the suspicion of abuse, but MDHS never opted to investigate.
I returned to The University of Mississippi to attend workshops for the purpose of
learning about Play Therapy, with the idea that this knowledge would increase my effectiveness
when working with situations involving child abuse. There I discovered that when MHPs are
involved in cases of child abuse there are complications that make the experience a frightening
one. At these workshops I heard stories from other MHPs similar to my own, in which MDHS
had not investigated reports of suspected abuse. We all had varying degrees of frustration at the
lack of response coupled with fear for our vulnerable clients, and ourselves. Then, if the case
culminated in courtroom testimony, the fear and frustration reached a fevered pitch. This all too
frequent situation, sadly, leads effective practitioners away from involvement in cases that
involve the abuse of children.
I again returned to The University of Mississippi to work on my doctorate, expecting to
design my dissertation around this topic. Initially, it appeared to me that the potential research
lay with MDHS, in that there seemed to be some undefined reason that MDHS minimized
reports that came from MHPs regarding suspected abuse. The legal aspect of my training
initially led me to somehow investigate the phenomenon from a legal stand point, as there are
laws which require MDHS to investigate reports of suspected abuse. I quickly realized however,
that this would have a minimal effect, as the laws are already in effect, and the apparent problem
is the inconsistent application of these laws. I then thought that investigating the responses of
MDHS workers might lead to rich data related to the understanding of how MHPs should
practice to increase the effectiveness of our working relationship with MDHS. At this point,
however, I remembered my mother‟s experience.
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During my mother‟s career, I often heard her discuss how individual judges expected
different things from MDHS when cases of abuse were presented, and how this fact would alter
the presentation of cases. This seemed to indicate that there is a defined system that exists
between MDHS and the judiciary. It also might suggest that this system is in some way directed
by judicial involvement. This led me to the decision to focus on judges. Judges logically seem
to be the most direct entryway into understanding the system expectations of MHPs working to
join the battle to protect a child from abuse.
As I increased my knowledge regarding qualitative research, the design for this study
began to take shape. Even though I have been trained in many ways on how to handle cases of
child abuse, my involvement always led to the development of more issues. My legal training
directed me to explore the possibility of different approaches to this issue. However, none led to
an answer that increased the effectiveness of my involvement in cases of CSA. Due to my
experience within the Youth Court system, I remembered that I often felt a sense of
disengagement between attorneys and MHPs. The attorneys often wanted and expected things
from us that we are not professionally or ethically capable of giving, such as unconditional
answers to the question of whether the child was abused, and by whom. Therefore it did not
seem that reviewing how MHPs should testify would lead to any knowledge that is not already
available, or increase my effectiveness when involved in such cases. I then thought of looking at
other cases to see if there were consistent themes, but this approach also was unsatisfying,
because each case of abuse is individualized, and would likely still leave unanswered questions.
I then returned to the possibility that the best way to increase my understanding of this
phenomenon might be to start with the decision maker, namely the judge. I began to realize that
the judges represented the proverbial elephant in the room. Of all the players on the battlefield,
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the judge represented the unknown. The substance of my own fear at involvement in court
began to take shape. The next logical step was to work to understand a judge's experience of this
phenomenon, and the most effective way to do this would be to interview judges. I therefore
propose to conduct a phenomenological study into how judges perceive the role of MHPs
involved in cases of CSA. I then worked to operationally define this phenomenon in such a way
that interview questions could be created to lead to themes that increase awareness of the judicial
perception of MHPs involved in cases of CSA. This could serve to improve MHP awareness of
how to best handle cases of child abuse.
When I worked to construct some type of definition of these cases to move toward the
development of interview questions, I realized that the area of child abuse is extremely complex.
This makes the development of interview questions more difficult. To simply ask what
experience the judge might have in cases of abuse is entirely too broad, and likely to bring
answers that involve personal reactions to abuse. Therefore, it became necessary for me to try to
put this phenomenon into some sort of framework to enable me to develop questions that would
lead to answers that are more directly related to the stated purpose. I then thought of how I
experienced involvement in cases of child abuse that led to my being called to testify in court. I
began to realize that some of my natural fear of these situations came from my lack of certainty
regarding what exactly a child's rights are in these cases. I am aware that they have the right to
be safe from abuse, but, I was not sure of exactly where the lines between the child's right to
safety and the parental right to direct the upbringing of that child are. Then the issue led to the
nervousness that accompanies the MHPs uncertainty of what role they are expected to play in the
courtroom. Then it would be necessary to understand what the system already has outlined as
expectations for MHPs. The issue was still too broad. There are many different types of abuse,

4

many different levels of MHPs, and numerous differences between different State to State
jurisdictions. One philosophy behind approaches taken by law professors is to teach the extreme
situations in the hope that the student will then be able to be more effective in the more mundane
situations that arise. I think that using extreme situations to approach this study will lead to more
rich data in the same manner.
My experience has indicated that the complications involved in cases of child abuse are
the most extreme in cases involving the sexual abuse of children, and for that reason, this study
focused on cases of child sexual abuse (CSA). The application of utilizing the extremes in the
design of the study does not so easily apply to the jurisdictional question, however. Working to
determine the most extreme jurisdiction regarding the sexual abuse of children is a research
question of its own, and for this reason I chose to limit my exploration to the State of
Mississippi, partly for convenience, but also because my experience within this jurisdiction
should help streamline my ability to understand the already existing approaches present therein.
In determining how to approach the issue of different levels of MHPs, the issue became
more complex. I am both a Licensed Professional Counselor (LPC) and a Registered Play
Therapist - Supervisor (RPT-S). I initially wanted to focus on Play Therapists as the MHPs in
this study. However, it quickly became evident that the difficulties involved in designing a study
that focused on the judicial perception of Play Therapists added a level of complication that
might detract from the stated purpose; for instance, the difficulty of insuring that I could recruit
enough participants, as each participant would be required to not only have experience with
MHPs testifying in the courtroom but also MHPs who are Play Therapists. It also became
evident that due to the many various labels of MHPs, and the fact that each can fulfill the roles
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MHPs are called to fill in CSA cases, focusing on one type of MHP might limit the application
of the data collected.
The question of whether or not the judicial perception is altered based on the type of
MHP is an interesting question, and might be worthy of its own research, but is too broad for the
scope of this study. However, one interview question was included that will explore the
possibility of altered judicial perception based on category of MHPs. This question was based
on Play Therapy as one of the newer forms of modality available for the treatment of abused
children. A brief discussion of the abuse of children follows, which highlights the need for
increased knowledge in this area.
Child Abuse
The abuse of children is an unconscionable act. Childhelp (n.d.) reports that
approximately 5.8 million children were abused in 2007, and that five children die every day due
to injuries received from abuse. Kesner, Bingham, and Kwon (2009) report that abuse is the
second leading cause of death among American children. This intentional infliction of harm on
some of the most defenseless members of society is, in our time, openly recognized as something
to abhor. However, children are still a disenfranchised and marginalized segment of our
population. Children's rights are narrow, and their voice is mostly ignored, unless verified by an
outside source (Cousins & Milner, 2007). Even though society does recognize the need to
protect children, as evidenced by the enactment of laws and funding of programs toward that
end, when this need to protect collides with the child's inability to effectively describe abuse, the
situation becomes extremely complex. When the rights of another who is not so marginalized
are thrown into the mix, the complexities multiply exponentially. This perfect storm of
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complexities creates an almost insurmountable obstacle for MHPs seeking to effectively
advocate, treat, or participate in such cases.
Historically, children have, at times, been thought of as chattel, or property (Carmichael,
2006). This created a worldview in which the treatment of children was completely left to their
parent or owner. Modern society has begun to recognize the necessity of occasional
governmental intervention to protect children from abuse. Childhelp reports $104 billion in costs
to protect children from abuse in 2007. However, as with any attempt to transform long held
societal customs, complications remain. Those who most closely work with cases of child abuse
clearly recognize that the individuality of human beings creates infinite possibilities of
behavioral actions, and trying to define and pinpoint each one is impossible. Still, try we must,
because the abuse of children is a behavior that society must work to eradicate as earnestly as
possible.
Children suffer many types of abuse. One form of abuse is neglect which happens when
a parent does not provide a child with the necessities to meet their basic needs, such as food,
shelter, and clothing. Children can be physically abused by parents who hit and beat them, either
through a misguided attempt to discipline or for some unspoken deeper psychological need.
Children also can be sexually abused by strangers or even family members.
There are usually many people involved in protecting a child from abuse. Parents
(assuming they are not perpetrators), teachers, school counselors, agency workers, police
officers, physicians, attorneys, judges, and hopefully, a MHP who is, has, or will treat the child,
can all play a role. For most of these people the roles are well defined. However, for the MHP
there are many issues that complicate the matter. One complication is that the individual child's
rights are not always clear. Another is the parent‟s rights. How do those change when the parent
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is the accused perpetrator? How does a MHP separate the role of clinician from that of advocate,
expert witness, or forensic evaluator? Or should he or she? What exactly does the system expect
from a MHP who is working outside this well-defined system when it comes to involvement at
the court level?
The Research Problem
The problem is how do judges perceive the roles that MHPs fill in cases of CSA. To be
able to understand this phenomenon more completely will increase the effectiveness of MHPs in
cases of CSA. There is also the possibility that the data can be used to direct further research
into this area.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this phenomenological study was to increase knowledge about the judicial
perception of the roles that MHPs play in cases of CSA. A review of the literature suggests that
the issues of children's rights, parental rights, the role of the clinician in cases of CSA, and the
expectations of the system influence this purpose.
Rationale and Significance
The rationale was to increase the awareness of MHPs of the perception that judges have
of the roles that MHPs fill in cases of CSA, so that MHPs may best practice advocating for the
benefit of the client. Working to understand the court's perspective of what is expected from
MHPs involved in CSA cases will assist in improving our understanding of how MHPs should
most effectively practice throughout a case of CSA. Increased awareness of how to most
effectively act on behalf of an individual abused client will contribute to an increased
effectiveness of advocating for marginalized children as a group, through increased recognition
of areas of which the system may need to be made more aware. Therefore, the possible
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significance of this study is that it clarifies the requirements for MHPs to undertake to best
practice to protect children both individually and as a marginalized group.
An independent assessment of the child's best interest is most necessary when children's
needs do not overlap entirely with their parents' decisions. Children are put at the most
severe risk when parents are unable or unwilling to give due consideration to their
children's best interest when making decisions regarding their upbringing, but if courts
refuse to acknowledge the possibility that those interest may diverge, children will be
unable to challenge parental choices that could have devastating effects on their wellbeing and future. (Dodds, 2006, p. 728)
The questions that MHPs ask themselves when making choices of how to deal with an
abused child will be simplified so that the MHP can focus more intently on the treatment of the
child. The importance of the inclusion of MHPs within the already crowded battleground of a
case of CSA will be made evident. The resistance that MHPs outside the well-defined
MDHS/judicial system meet while trying to find a spot on the crowded landscape can lead to
self-doubt and hesitancy on the part of the MHP. Hopefully, the end result of this study will give
MHPs a basis on which to more readily justify their involvement in CSA cases by using the data
to increase knowledge and decrease the anxiety often associated with MHP participation in a
courtroom. A more clear process for MHPs to utilize when dealing with CSA cases became
evident. Areas in need of further research were discovered.
Limitations and Delimitations
This study will be limited to the responses of judges within the State of Mississippi.
Although this may limit the transferability of this study, the fact that each State has its own
system regarding the procedure for handling CSA creates complications that can distract from
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the main issue. Limiting this study to one State removes the need for exhaustive comparisons of
State by State procedures which often detract from addressing the main issue of what actions a
MHP should take by cluttering the information with minutia. The singular focus also serves to
increase the study's usefulness. MHPs who practice outside this State can easily apply the results
of this study by comparing and contrasting the requirements as determined by the Mississippi
judges in this study against the known differences in legal standards within any other State.
In addressing this topic, the study delimitation was the choice to focus only on sexual
abuse. This also limits confusion, as the number of factors that impact abuse cases can blur the
lens and decrease clarity on how each case should be handled. I am taking the approach of
focusing on one type of abuse so as to increase clarity regarding a potential operational outline of
how to respond in cases of CSA. Perhaps another study could be undertaken to address issues
that are unique to other types of abuse and/or custody issues.
Definitions
Some terms that will be used in this study are defined for the purpose of increasing
clarity. As with qualitative inquiry, the study itself may lead to the emergence of themes or ideas
that will then be defined. Even though many of these terms would be understood without formal
definition, I wish to make clear how the terms are intended to be used within this study.
The Mississippi Department of Human Services web site uses the following
definition of sexual abuse:
any inappropriate touching by a friend, family member, anyone having on-going contact
and/or a stranger such as:


touching a child‟s genital area



any type of penetration of a child
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allowing a child to view or participate in pornography



prostitution, selling your child for money, drugs, etc.



forcing a child to perform oral sex acts



masturbating in front of a child



having sex in front of a child (Mississippi Department of Human Services, n.d.)

The Mississippi Code of 1972, sec. 43-21-105(n) defines sexual abuse in this manner:
obscene or pornographic photographing, filming or depiction of children for commercial
purposes, or the rape, molestation, incest, prostitution or other such forms of sexual
exploitation of children under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or
welfare is harmed or threatened. (Mississippi Code of 1972, 2010)
Additionally, the Office on Child Abuse and Neglect (DHHS), an agency within the US
Department of Health and Human Services, defines sexual abuse as:
inappropriate adolescent or adult sexual behavior with a child. It includes fondling a
child's genitals, making the child fondle the adult's genitals, intercourse, incest, rape,
sodomy, exhibitionism, sexual exploitation, or exposure to pornography. To be
considered child abuse, these acts have to be committed by a person responsible for the
care of a child (for example a baby-sitter, a parent, or a daycare provider) or related to the
child. If a stranger commits these acts, it would be considered sexual assault and handled
solely be the police and criminal courts. (DePanfilis & Salus, 2003)
The differing definitions of sexual abuse indicate that even the most basic aspect of CSA
is not always clear. This paper will use the definition found within the Mississippi Code.
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The field of mental health has grown through the years, which has led to many different
professional designations. The practice of psychology is defined by the Mississippi Code,
Section 73-31-3, as:
Practice of psychology means the description, interpretation and modification of human
behavior through the application of psychological principles and procedures. The practice
of psychology includes, but is not limited to, the assessment of personal characteristics
such as intelligence, personality, ability, and other cognitive, behavioral and
neuropsychological functioning, and efforts to change or improve symptomatic,
maladaptive behavior or mental health through psychotherapy procedures including
psychoanalysis, behavior therapy, biofeedback and hypnosis. Psychologists diagnose and
treat mental and emotional disorders, disorders of habit and conduct, and disorders
associated with physical illness or injury. Psychological services are provided to
individuals, families, groups and the public. The practice of psychology shall be
construed within the meaning of this definition without regard to whether payment is
received for services rendered. (2010)
Section 73-53-3 (Mississippi Code of 1972, 2010) defines the practice of social work as
"the professional activity directed at enhancing, protecting or restoring people's capacity
for social functioning, whether impaired by physical, environmental or emotional factors"
and the practice of clinical social work as "the application of social work methods and
values in diagnosis and treatment directed at enhancing , protecting or resorting people's
capacity for social functioning, whether impaired by physical, environmental or
emotional factors" (2010).
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A Licensed Professional Counselor, practicing counseling/psychotherapy, is described as
a person
rendering, offering to render or supervising those who render to individuals, groups,
organizations, corporations, institutions, government agencies of the general public any
service involving the applications of counseling procedures and other related areas of the
behavioral sciences to help in learning how to solve problems or make decisions related
to personal growth, marriage, family or other interpersonal or intrapersonal concerns.
(Mississippi Code of 1972, sec. 73-30-3, 2010)
and continues to define counseling/psychotherapy as involving "diagnosis, assessment and
treatment" (2010).
The Association for Play Therapy (APT) website (Association for Play Therapy, n.d.)
defines play therapy as "the systematic use of a theoretical model to establish an interpersonal
process wherein trained play therapists use the therapeutic powers of play to help clients prevent
or resolve psychosocial difficulties and achieve optimal growth and development" (Association
for Play Therapy). .
Inside Mississippi, an advocacy group for abused children, describes what this study
means when referring to the Mississippi Department of Human Services (MDHS):
Child Welfare Services are services made available to children whose parents are unable
to appropriately care for their children. It provides protective services, foster care,
adoption, and specialized services (psychological, physiological, and financial needs) to
the children who are in their care. If there is a claim of an abuse or neglect, a social
worker investigates the allegation. If the abuse is substantiated, the Youth Court Judge
gives the custody to the State for protective custody. The child is then moved to foster
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care where specialized services are given. The social worker advocates for the best
interest of the child, be it termination of parental rights or reunification of the family. If
reunification is accomplished the case is closed - if termination of parental rights is
rendered, the child goes up for adoption. The social worker monitors the child until the
age of 18 (Inside Mississippi, n.d.).
There are also different roles that a MHP can play in cases of CSA. These are advocate,
clinician, expert witness, and forensic evaluator. An example of an advocate is a Guardian ad
Litem (GAL). A GAL is usually appointed by the court, and the purpose of their involvement is
to objectively determine the child's best interest. The GAL will interview all the people involved
and review all the records of the case. This will lead to the development of an opinion on the
best outcome for the child, having determined all the options open to that child. (Ceci &
Hembrooke, 2002)
A clinician is usually called to court as a fact witness, sometimes called a lay witness.
The clinician has a potential bias in favor of the child, because a bond has usually developed
between the clinician and the child, due to the type of relationship. A fact witness will testify
only to relevant, first-hand information regarding the case. It is often preferable to the clinician
to be called as a fact witness, in that the therapeutic role is protected (Ceci & Hembrooke, 2002).
An expert witness is a witness who is called specifically to testify regarding a specific
issue (Ceci & Hembrooke, 2002). This testimony is to serve the purpose of educating the court
on a specific issue, of which the expert has specific knowledge. Sometimes an expert witness
has access to the entire record of the case, but sometimes the expert sits in the courtroom and
develops an opinion based on all the evidence that is admitted in the case. Occasionally, a
clinician may be asked to fulfill both roles in one case. This is not ideal, as will be discussed in
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the literature review, and can lead to a situation that creates confusion for the MHP, as well as
for the court.
Forensic evaluation is a specialty within the area of MHPs. Forensic evaluators can be
court appointed, but also can be privately retained. A forensic evaluator is someone who is
trained in interviewing children without suggestion, and assessing the situation for the presence
or absence of abuse. (Ceci & Hembrooke, 2002)
To define children's rights is another difficult task. No specific delineation of what a
child's rights are was located, except within the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, a treaty that the United States has not yet ratified. UNICEF states that
human rights apply to all age groups; children have the same rights as adults. But
children are particularly vulnerable and so they also have particular rights that recognize
their special need for protection…It reflects a new vision of the child. Children are
neither property of their parents nor are they helpless objects of charity. They are human
beings and are the subject of their own rights. (n.d.)
Even though UNICEF defines a child as anyone under the age of eighteen (n.d.), the State
of Mississippi's statutory definition of the age of majority is twenty-one (Mississippi Code of
1972, 2010). However, there are numerous exceptions to the demarcation of twenty-one,
including the right to enter into a contract, the right to sue or be sued, the right to serve as an
executor or administrator of a will, and the right to enter into agreements related to real property
(2010). The single specified right denied those between the apparently grey ages of eighteen and
twenty-one, is the purchase of alcohol. This paper will refer to children as those under the age of
eighteen.
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Because of the many different nontraditional forms of families that exist in today's
society, it might be appropriate to define what this study means by the term parent, because this
can become a complicated issue as well. The child, whose rights are ill-defined, must depend on
his or her parents for the execution of those rights. The term parent, in this paper, will be used to
refer to whomever, individual or agency, stands in the position of the parent in relation to the
child, whether through biology or legal process.
Working to then understand what a parent's rights are in relation to their children is also
fraught with difficulty. There is no enacted parent's bill of rights, as such. There is a general
recognition that parental rights are fundamental, and absolute, unless the parent has been deemed
unfit. Our system of government takes a federalist stand on this issue, leaving this to the
determination of each State. This is another factor adding to the complications that arise in cases
of CSA.
Summary
The need to stop the abuse of children has thankfully become an accepted societal goal.
This recognition has led to the development of laws and programs specifically geared toward that
end. Those who are most closely involved in this fight carry a great responsibility, and need
clear guidelines to protect and stop the sexual abuse of children. Even though some of the
procedures and guidelines are clear for those on the front line, the battle plan is not always so
clear to MHPs.
To increase the confidence and effectiveness of MHPs within these cases, this study
worked toward increasing the awareness of the judicial perception of the role of MHPs involved
in cases of CSA, based on what actual judges report they expect when MHPs are called to court.
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This might allow MHPs to enter the fray boldly and become a more effective agent in advocating
for the victims of CSA.
In conducting the literature review, no specific research was located that followed the
pattern this project will take. The literature review will be premised on the issues of children's
rights, parent's rights, balancing the different roles MHPs might be called to fill in cases of CSA,
and the system's expectations of MHPs in cases of CSA. Each section will begin with
established legal guidelines, if available. The sections will then be separated into literature
written from a legal standpoint, and literature written from a mental health perspective, as my
research indicates the two perspectives vary greatly.
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Chapter Two
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This literature review includes literature from both a legal perspective and a mental
health perspective. The purpose is to gain understanding of what a child's rights in cases of CSA
are; what a parent's rights in cases of CSA are, and how those alter when the parent is the
suspected perpetrator; what issues a MHP should consider when determining how to balance
conflicting roles that can exist in CSA cases; and what the system expects from MHPs testifying
in CSA cases. The review consists of a section for each issue. The sections begin with any
system established guidelines, followed by the presentation of current literature from either the
legal community or the mental health community, or both.
Children's Rights
No specific outline of children's rights was located, other than the United Nation‟s
Convention on the Rights of the Child, put forth in 1989. This document is of great significance
to the debate surrounding children's rights, but as the United States has not ratified this treaty, it
is only referred to through the articles included. Because this project is limited to the State of
Mississippi, a search of Mississippi statutes was undertaken, and none were found that specified
any clearly delineated children's rights. There are statutes that discuss the procedures that should
be utilized when addressing issues that involve children, but those are included in the section
discussing system expectations. The articles on children's rights in this section are almost
exclusively from the legal community, with a brief review of the manner in which various ethical
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codes from the mental health community address the issue. The section will begin with articles
that outline some basic philosophical beliefs regarding the rights of children.
Simon (2000) discussed one current approach to defining children's rights as addressed
by the United Nations. The author points out the difficulties that exist within any discussion of
how best to protect children, stating that the debate often gets derailed by attempts to define the
rights of a child. The solution to this, as this article suggests, is to focus primarily on obligations
and the duty to protect the child from harm. This leads to a philosophy that suggests that a child
cannot enjoy rights until he or she is safe from harm. Therefore, if the moral obligation to
protect children from harm is recognized, society must address the protection of children before
the definition of a child's rights can be achieved.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child developed out of the atrocities
suffered by two million Polish children during World War II. Simon (2000) states that in the
history of the United Nations, this treaty was the most rapidly ratified by the highest number of
member nations. Simon states "The Convention is not a catalogue of rights but rather a
comprehensive list of obligations taken by states"(p. 5).
This approach is significant to a discussion of a child's rights in relation to CSA. As
Simon indicates, the delineation of a child's right to be free from abuse does not impact the harm
inflicted, and also detracts from the repugnant act itself. He compares this to the situation of
murder, noting that the individual‟s right not to be murdered has no impact on the moral
injunction against murder itself (Simon 2000).
Reframing the issue of what a child's rights are into recognition that whatever rights a
child has or does not have depends on his or her freedom from harm does simplify the issue.
Simon (2000) mentions that one aspect of the Convention is that it begins to outline duties that
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the ratifying States have towards the protection of the children within their borders. Many of the
harms meant to be addressed by this convention are of a global nature, but the author includes
child abuse within those harms against which the State should protect a child. This can serve as
a foundation for approaching CSA cases for MHPs. Specifically, first, protect the child. A more
specific description of children's rights in the United States can be found in Fetzer and Houlgate's
1997 article, entitled "Are Juveniles still 'Persons' under the United States Constitution."
At one time the United States Supreme Court seemed to be embarking on a path which
would increase the recognition of children as persons recognized by the U.S. Constitution. This
began with Justice Fortas who stated that "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school house gate"
(Fetzer & Houlgate, 1997, p. 325). However, beginning in 1984, this waned, to the point that
this standard no longer seems to apply.
Fetzer and Houlgate (1997) indicate that discussions regarding the rights of children
develop in two directions, namely the direction of a child's right to welfare rights or in the
direction of liberty rights. Welfare rights include the right to be protected and benefits special to
the class, and liberty rights refer to having the same rights as adults, and being able to act
independently of a parent. This article focuses on liberty rights, which serves as a way to define
the legal system's relationship with children.
The U.S. Supreme Court appears to put children in a special category. The Court
recognizes that children have rights, but they place many restrictions on the exercise of these
rights. Children do not have the right to be free from incarceration prior to trial based on the idea
that the child might commit further harm to him or herself if not detained. A child's rights to free
speech within a public school system are restricted to the point of nonexistence. A student
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within a public school is not free from unreasonable search and seizure. An athlete at the same
school is not free of drug testing even absent prior suspicion of illegal drug use (Fetzer &
Houlgate, 1997).
Fetzer and Houlgate (1997) suggest a new approach to the issue of children's rights.
They argue that the court is laboring under the misconception that a child either has full rights or
exists in some specialized class requiring custodial protection. The authors suggest a continuum
approach, referred to as enjoyment theory. The enjoyment theory approach would recognize that
"children might possess the same rights now possessed by adults, while being justifiably denied
complete enjoyment of some of these rights until a future time" (p. 335).
This leads to a three pronged approach to the theory of children's rights:
(a) Children as persons have the same set of constitutional rights possessed by adults. (b)
Primarily because children have not yet developed into autonomous beings as capable as
the average adult of making free and informed choices, they may justifiably be restricted
from the full enjoyment of some of their constitutional rights. However, (c) these
restrictions are limited to those necessary to the child's development of future autonomy.
(p. 336)
This approach clearly recognizes the obligation and duty to protect a child against harm that is
outlined in the Simon (2000) article. The argument can be made that this balancing of a child's
rights against the State's recognition of a need for the child to develop into future autonomy
(should they accept this philosophy) could clearly impact cases of CSA.
In 2005, Mason addressed the history of the development of children's rights, or the lack
thereof, in the United States. The article points out that while the United States was very
involved in the development of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, only the United States
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and Somalia have failed to ratify the treaty. The UNICEF website faq page points out that
Somalia does not have a recognized government, and therefore cannot ratify treaties (UNICEF,
2008). So, in effect, the United States is the only country to fail to ratify the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.
Although one of the reasons offered for this failure to ratify is that the United States
already provides children with the rights delineated in the treaty, Mason (2005) disagrees. She
discussed the impact that ratification had in other countries known for their advancement of
human rights. In many of those countries ratification led to a reevaluation of the manner in
which the ratifying country actually responded to children.
Mason (2005) then discussed how the United States' worldview of children developed.
She points out that initially, children were certainly thought of as chattel, or property, but goes
even further to point out that children were viewed as a parental asset, due to the parent's right to
indenture the child, or have the child work within the family. This author suggests that the
recognition of a child's rights has always been balanced against that of his or her parents. This
creates a dichotomy in which rights granted to the child are seen as being denied to the parent.
Time made it clear that children should have the right to be protected, and that sometimes the
State must be the child's representative in pursuing this right, but there is still no recognition of a
child's participatory/liberty rights.
It is the modern, controversial concept of children's participatory rights, the right to
express their views freely in accordance with their age and maturity, the right to be
represented in all judicial and administrative proceedings, and the right to be considered
as persons with interests apart from their parents that has not been fully realized or even
fully recognized in the United States. (Mason, p. 959)
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Mason (2005) recognizes that the American legal system‟s approach to children's rights
is the most active in relation to juvenile criminal proceedings. The courts have recognized some
participatory rights of children in these instances, granting children most of the due process
rights guaranteed to adults. Notable exceptions include the right to a speedy trial, a right to bail,
and a right to have their case heard by a jury of their peers. At the same time, courts have
curtailed some of the historically accepted right to be protected, as evidenced by the increased
push to try children as adults, as well as the application of capital punishment to children as
young as fourteen.
Another area that poses an interesting point of reference for children's rights is in relation
to a minor's involvement in decisions regarding medical procedures. There is a great division
among states regarding a minor's consent to an abortion, but a general agreement on a minor's
right to consent to treatment of addiction or sexually transmitted diseases (Mason, 2005). This
indicates a continued lean toward the protective approach to determining the rights of children
when attempting to weigh these against each other.
In the application of family law, Mason (2005) points out that even though the courts
espouse the "best interests of the child" tenant, in reality the child's voice is rarely acknowledged
in custody cases, when often the child is not even represented by counsel. "The voice of the
child is often absent from proceedings that determine his or her home." (p. 961). This might
indicate a continued reluctance to recognize that a child's rights can have equal weight with those
of his or her parents.
Dodds, (2006) paints an even dimmer picture of the status of children's rights in America.
"The United States is not doing a very good job protecting the rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness of this nation's children, who lack the capacity to defend their rights on their
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own" (p. 719). The article follows a form of the "enjoyment theory" espoused by Fetzer &
Houlgate, in that Dodds (2006) draws a comparison between abortion rights and children's rights,
stating that it is a
misguided premise that human lives only deserve constitutional rights once a set level of
development is reached. True recognition of the civil rights of children will not
meaningfully progress until America learns to value children at all stages of
development. (p. 719)
Dodds (2006) discusses many areas that touch on children's rights, including abortion, a
parent's right to direct their child's education, child abuse, and infanticide. In each area the
conclusion reached is that the parent or State's rights take precedence to any consideration of the
child's voice.
The court did acknowledge the presence of a third party, [the child] but the role given to
the child remained tangential, focused only on the child's right to influence the parent's
decision, as opposed to a right to have his specific interests or desires considered as a
separate constitutional matter. (p. 727)
Dodds (2006) explains that even in cases of infanticide the tendency is to treat these cases
as something other than murder. It is acknowledged that these cases initiate great public outrage,
but, by the time there is actual court involvement, the case is often not prosecuted, or the charge
is something less than murder, or the sentence is probation. Some countries even statutorily
mandate that infanticide of very young children be counted as manslaughter.
The subject of child maltreatment also was considered. In this area, the stance taken by
Dodds (2006) is that the rights of the parents are still given more weight, and great care is taken
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to ensure that the parent's due process rights are protected, while the child's rights to safety are,
in effect, rendered nonexistent.
If the state does nothing to protect a child it knows to be at risk, the child will have no
remedy against the state. In short, the Court holds that the state does not owe anything to
children; it might take action, but if it decides not to, the child has no recourse. And even
when the state does intervene, court rules and limitations will often stifle the ability of the
system to make a real difference; as courts will defer to parents' interests, rather than the
child's right to be in a safe environment and loved and nurtured by a consistent and stable
family. (p. 733)
There are some organizations working to change this.
Recently, a class action law suit was brought against the State of Mississippi by the class
of abused and neglected children in Mississippi. The case alleges that "Mississippi's child
welfare system has systematically failed to meet its legal obligation to protect and care for all of
the State's abused and neglected children, all as a result of gross mismanagement and
underfunding of Mississippi's overburdened child welfare system" (Olivia Y. ex rel. Johnson v.
Barbour, 351 F. Supp 2d 543, S.D. MS, 2004, p. 547).
The plaintiffs alleged that there are two classes of children, those in the custody of
MDHS, and those about whom reports of suspected abuse have been received. The legal basis
for the claims is that the State was systematically denying the children their procedural due
process rights, rights to equal protection under the law, substantive due process rights, and rights
granted to them by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA).
The court dismissed most of the plaintiff's claims on the basis that none of the situations
alleged resulted in a right that could be expected to be protected by the State. The court did
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acknowledge the State's interest in protecting children, but the procedural due process claim was
dismissed on the grounds that no specific outcome was guaranteed to children. This means that
the process guaranteed to children is the process by which a report of abuse is made. The state
has not guaranteed any specific outcome to abused children. The equal protection clause claims
were dismissed because there was no proof that the State had acted with any intent toward
denying the children their rights. Proving that a person‟s rights have been violated under the
equal protection clause requires proof that the State intended to discriminate against the person
or class of persons. There was no evidence of any intentional discrimination against the class of
children specified in the case. The claims under the AACWA fell because the court held that the
statute did not grant any specific actionable rights to the children.
However, in relation to the children already in the custody of the State, a different
relationship was found. Once the State has taken custody of a child, a relationship of duty
develops. The court made no comment on the quality of the claim, but found that this claim was
viable, and was not dismissed.
In November 2007, a settlement was reached (Office of the Attorney General of the State
of Mississippi, 2007), where MDHS agreed to become accredited by the Council on
Accreditation; to increase the number of workers; to improve the hiring standards for and
training of workers; to increase services offered to foster parents; to develop a 24-hour hotline
for the reporting of suspected abuse; and to improve initial assessments of a child's needs when
he or she enters the system.
A review of five codes of ethics from the mental health community was undertaken
(American Counseling Association, 2005; American Mental Health Counselors Association,
2010; American Psychological Association, 2010; American School Counselors Association,
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2010; Association for Play Therapy, 2009). The reason was to outline the mental health
community's view of children's rights, in light of the previous discussion. The six organizational
codes of ethics and/or guidelines for practice, promulgated by the American Psychological
Association, the American Counseling Association, the American Mental Health Counselors
Association, the American School Counselors Association, and the Association for Play Therapy
are in line with the dichotomy of either a child's right to protection, or a child's right to
participate.
The American Psychological Association Code of Ethics (2010) takes the approach that
children are not a special class of people in need of particular attention, in that I did not note any
specific mention of children at all. The implication would seem to be that children are to be
treated as any other recipient of services. This is very much akin to the United States position
that there is no need to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The
implication here would be that a child's rights to the ethical receipt of psychological services are
already covered in the ethics code as it exists.
Apparently, however, the organization does recognize the need for specific guidelines
when psychological services are involved in the evaluation of child custody. The APA has
authored a separate document regarding the ethical practices psychologists should follow when
conducting evaluations for child custody (APA, 2009). The majority of the document is focused
on the procedures that professionals should follow, with only the first three of the fourteen
tenants specifically directed to the rights of the child. The document struggles with the idea that
a child has rights, so that each of the first three tenants reiterates that the psychologist should use
the best interests of the child standard in conducting these evaluations. "The purpose of the
evaluation is to assist in determining the psychological best interests of the child" (APA, p. 5),
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"The child's welfare is paramount" (APA, p. 6), but it even goes further to say "Psychologists
seek to maintain an appropriate degree of respect for and understanding of parent's practical and
personal concerns; however, psychologists are mindful that such considerations are ultimately
secondary to the welfare of the child" (APA, p. 6).
The American Counseling Association (2005) takes one step closer to recognizing the
participatory rights of children. They do acknowledge children, mentioning children
specifically, but it is in relation to recognizing that children are incompetent to consent to
treatment, and that the child's rights rest with the assumed altruistically motivated parent or
guardian. There is reference to abuse and the necessity to follow applicable laws regarding the
reporting of suspected abuse.
The American Mental Health Counselors Association (AMHCA) Code of Ethics (2010)
goes a portion of a step further, by, at least arguably acknowledging that sometimes children's
rights may run counter to their parent's rights. When discussing confidentiality, it is stated that
while the parent or guardian has the right to the records, (in this code, children are specifically
delineated, even though referred to as minors), the counselor "must take measures to safeguard
client confidentiality within legal limits" (AMHCA, p. 2). Still, however, the parent's rights are
specifically stated, and the implication is that counselors should tread lightly. "Mental health
counselors embrace the diversity of the family system and the inherent rights and responsibilities
parents/guardians have for the welfare of their children" (AMHCA, p. 5).
The ethical guidelines from the American School Counselors Association (2010) are
more thorough regarding the importance of the recognition of the rights of children, but the
document uses the term student instead of child, and also makes a point of recognizing the
importance of balancing the rights of the students against the rights of the parents. Even though
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the document does refer to the existence of divorce and separation, the code states that the school
counselor should involve both parents, except when a court order prohibits disclosure. This
document also encourages the counselor to take the student‟s development level and individual
circumstances into consideration.
The Association for Play Therapy Best Practices document is on the other end of this
spectrum, recognizing the child's rights as separate from but equal to, the rights of the parent or
guardian. The Association for Play Therapy Best Practices (2009) states that the "play therapist
recognizes and respects that the child is the primary client" (APT, p. 3). There is a particular
section devoted to the recognition that the child may not have any say in entering the therapeutic
relationship, but encourages the Play Therapist to take the child's wishes into consideration.
Parent's Rights
As the previous section shows, a child's rights are often thought to be some sort of
function of a parent's rights, so, what then are a parent's rights? "The United States Constitution
does not mention families, nor does it bestow any positive rights, such as a governmental
obligation to provide health, food, education or an adequate standard of living" (Elrod, 2005, p.
167). The federal government seems to want to leave parent's rights to the decision of the States.
There have been some federal statutes enacted to address the rights of children, parents, and
families, but Elrod (2005) states that the federal judiciary continues to refuse jurisdiction when
family rights are involved.
The Mississippi Code of 1972, sec. 93-13-1 has the following to say about parental
guardianship of minor children:
The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor children and are
equally charged with their care, nurture, welfare and education, and the care and
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management of their estates. The father and mother shall have equal powers and rights,
and neither parent has any right paramount to the right of the other concerning the
custody of the minor or the control of the services or the earnings of such minor, or any
other matter affecting the minor. If either father or mother die or be incapable of acting,
the guardianship devolves upon the surviving parent. Neither parent shall forcibly take a
child from the guardianship of the parent legally entitled to its custody. But if any father
or mother be unsuitable to discharge the duties of guardianship, then the court, or
chancellor in vacation, may appoint some suitable person, or having appointed the father
or mother, may remove him or her if it appear that such person is unsuitable, and appoint
a suitable person. (2010)

There are also statues that delineate how parental rights can be terminated and some that
relate to custody issues and some that relate to medical decisions, but not many that outline what
should happen when children‟s rights and parental rights are in conflict. A discussion of some
relevant court cases will outline a parent‟s rights. The United States Supreme Court recognized
the fundamental right of a parent to make choices regarding the upbringing of their children in
Meyer v. Nebraska (262 U.S. 390, 1923). The case involved a parent's rights to make
educational choices impacting their children. This recognition of the existence of a right created
a situation in which the State cannot infringe upon this right without adhering to the due process
of law.

In the 1982 case of Santosky v. Kramer (455 U.S. 745, 1982), the Supreme Court
recognized that the fundamental right of a parent could not be taken away without clear and
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convincing evidence, as opposed to the lesser standard of a preponderance of the evidence.
Justice Blackmun stated
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management
of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships
are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of
their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental
rights have a more critical need for procedural protection than do those resisting state
intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened
familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. (p. 753)
Washington State enacted a statute that gave any interested adult the right to sue for
visitation rights with a child. In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 2000, this statute was
challenged. The court reaffirmed the fundamental right of a parent to direct a child's upbringing.
The case involved two children whose deceased father's parents were seeking visitation rights.
The children's mother did not object to visitation, but requested that it not be as often as the
grandparent's requested. The trial court compromised, granting more visitation than the mother
requested, but less than the grandparents sought. However, there was no finding of fault with the
mother; no indication that the mother's judgment was flawed in any way. Therefore, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the decision, stating that fundamental rights of parents could not be
infringed upon without clear and convincing evidence of a problem with the parents' opinion.
The trial judge made the decision on the basis of the fact that no evidence had been produced that
would indicate that visitation with the grandparents would be harmful to the children. The
Supreme Court, however, pointed out that this basically put the burden to establish that the visits
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would be harmful to the children onto the parent, whose judgment had never been questioned.
The Court held that the parent's opinion could not be superseded by the judge's just because the
judge's opinion differed. The State would have to indicate in some way that the parent's
judgment was somehow invalid.
All of these cases indicate that when a child's rights run counter to the parent's, the State
will take the place of the parent. However, the parent's right to determine their child's destiny is
a well recognized fundamental right, such that the termination of this right must not be taken
lightly. The underlying belief in this approach is that parents can be trusted, unless proven unfit,
to act in the best interests of their child.
Elrod (2005) briefly outlines the history of the recognition of family rights in the United
States. The complexity of this issue is not only apparent when the child's rights might run
counter to the parent's, but also when the parent's rights to the child run counter to each other.
Today this situation is more frequent, with the increase of nontraditional families in America,
such as same sex partnerships where children are involved, or when the child is conceived
through the assistance of fertility treatments, such as artificial insemination or surrogate mothers.
Elrod (2005) states general parental rights as recognized by all States within the United
States as follows:
As a general rule biological or legal parents, including unwed fathers, have the
fundamental right to the care, custody and control of their children free from state
intervention. Parents are entitled to the physical possession of their children (and their
earnings) and can make decisions about their residence, medical care, education, religion,
and with whom the child associates. The state can intrude upon the parental relationship
only with the parent's consent or through use of its parens patriae power to protect the
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child, as in the case of abuse and neglect. To terminate a parent's rights to the child, the
state must prove unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. (p. 169).
In this quote it is hard to deny the obvious relation to a child as property.
Our continued march toward progression has created situations in which the potential for
violation of a child's rights can be undertaken by the very parent who is assumed to be worthy of
the trust and responsibility bestowed thereby. Appel (2009) shines a light on a particularly tragic
situation that can occur when parent's rights are construed to take precedence over that of the
child.
The medical technology which has allowed life support systems to keep vegetative
individuals alive for many years, has led to an extreme ethical issue, namely, what is a doctor to
do when a parent refuses to deny care for a child that is on life support, and the reason for this
denial is that the parent could be charged with murder if the child dies (Appel, 2009)? This
situation is apropos here, in that cases in which a child has accused a parent of abuse create the
same dynamic. The parent's rights will be infringed upon if the allegation of abuse is found to be
true, so the accused parent has a vested interest in the child being proved a liar.
Appel (2009) suggested that the answer lies in the application of the best interests of the
child doctrine. The author suggests that the doctrine always be applied in criminal acts where
the parental decision making might be impacted by the crime. This suggestion was to be applied
to cases whether the perpetrator was the parent or not, as the parent's ability to separate his or her
own emotions from what is best for the child is unlikely in either case.
This was assumed to lead to a situation in which the court would take jurisdiction;
however, courts will always seek the best interest of the child in cases that involve the welfare of
children. The question becomes when can a State substitute its opinion of what is in the child's
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best interest for what the parent thinks is in the child's best interest. This portion of literature
review indicates that a child's rights, other than the right to safety, always lie with a third party,
either the parent or the State. Therefore, unless the State chooses to actively involve itself in a
case of CSA, the child has no recourse. It is hard to understand how the State can recognize a
right, but leave the person entitled to that right with no recourse when the right is denied.
There are at least two legal constructs, parens patriae and in locus parentis, that address
this issue (DeMitchell, 2002). This review indicates that the use of parens patriae is more
referenced in discussions of the State's assuming the protection of children's rights, but perhaps
in locus parenti should not be ignored. To compare and contrast, parens patriae indicates a more
permanent substitution of the State for the parent, while in locus parenti could be instituted for
situations in which the parental rights might be returned later; such as if the parent is found
innocent of abuse, or when a parent's emotional response to crimes committed against their child
render them unlikely to objectively consider the best interests of the child.
Professionals who work with children are often caught in this triangle of assessing the
truth of allegations of abuse, and of protecting the child from possible danger, while not
infringing on the parent's rights. The next section will discuss this issue more directly.
Clinician Roles
This brings us to the question of what role should MHPs play in relation to the child
within CSA. The lines between the many roles that a MHP might fill can easily blur. On the one
hand, the MHP might feel that pursuing a case of abuse could be harmful to the particular client,
but at the same time feel the need to advocate against abuse. The MHP might be called in to
determine the credibility of the disclosure, which requires a different mindset, as well as skill set,
than that of a clinician working to assist the child in adjusting to life in the aftermath of abuse.
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Sometimes the MHP is called in before any abuse is suspected, and then asked to become a
forensic evaluator. Sometimes the MHP is called in after the initial disclosure has been made.
Sometimes the MHP is called as an expert witness; sometimes as a fact witness.
At all times, however, even when court appointed, the MHP is safe in pursuing the best
interests of the child, but how far does that actually go? Being aware that I am not omnipotent, I
cannot with absolute certainty declare whether abuse has occurred, or who perpetrated it. I did
not find any literature exactly addressing the balancing of the differing roles, but will include
some that discuss the roles separately.
The traditional attitude that is taken by the mental health community regarding CSA is
that it is an atrocity. At the same time, however, a public reluctance to discuss this issue is
apparent, especially as it pertains to specific cases. Nelson (1998) takes direct issue with this
approach. "The enforcement of silence has been and remains the most potent weapon of abusers,
both individually and collectively. Breaking silence has likewise been seen as the crucial first
step towards bringing about change and a safer environment" (p. 145).
Nelson (1998) recognizes the concept of confidentiality, but is referring here to
administratively imposed silence. There are many reasons she recognizes for agency imposed
silence. These include potential embarrassment at mishandled cases, the fear of being sued, and
the fear of being misrepresented or manipulated. Nelson points out, however, that the refusal of
professionals involved in cases of CSA to speak on the subject publicly is inconsistent with an
attitude of disgust toward sexual abuse itself. "Skirting tactfully around real injustices against
real people is itself a form of collusion in a silence that has to be broken" (p. 151). The MHP
operates under an apparent double standard by encouraging our clients to speak out, but then
being reticent to do so ourselves.
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Nelson's (1998) position is related to situations in which those "forces aligned to combat
child sexual abuse" (p. 145) have been brought into question. Her position is that if we are to be
advocates for children, then we must assertively communicate our position, even in the face of
disagreement. Maybe even, especially in the face of disagreement. She points out that when an
agency's investigation of a particular situation has been called into question, the appropriate
response is not to refuse to comment, but, instead, to explain. The author posits that MHPs
should be courageous enough to acknowledge fault and increase the public's understanding of
this complex issue as opposed to allowing the public to once again relegate the sexual abuse of
children to the silence of secrecy. "It is possible to be outspoken in a courteous way and from
the principle that the first duty is to protect vulnerable children" (p. 148).
A 1998 case study is particularly relevant here. This article is a good example of the
expected role a forensic examiner should fulfill, as contrasted with the danger of becoming an
advocate.
Because of the strong emotions evoked by child sexual abuse and the polarization of
views by some professionals involved in this area, litigated custody and visitation cases
involving such accusations may lure the forensic evaluator from the role of a neutral
scientist into the role of an advocate for the alleged victim, or for the accused. (Kuehnle,
1998, p. 2)
The case study examines a forensic evaluation conducted by Dr. Joseph Smith, a
psychologist appointed as a forensic examiner. The parents had divorced when their daughter
Amy was six months old. When Amy was five years old, her grandmother witnessed her
attempting to assert a curling iron into her vagina. When asked, she reported to her grandmother
that her father and step-brother put their fingers in her vagina. Amy's mother sought the advice
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of a MHP, and was encouraged to file an emergency petition for a change in the custody and/or
visitation of Amy with her father. The court appointed Dr. Smith to conduct the forensic
evaluation (Kuehnle, 1998).
Dr. Smith's evaluation was fraught with issues, culminating in his contacting the father's
attorney to file an emergency petition to remove custody from the mother and place it with the
father. The most glaring issue within the case was that Dr. Smith never interviewed Amy's
grandmother, who had reported the initial disclosure. His testimony in the courtroom showed a
lack of understanding on his part of the developmental issues present in cases such as this one.
He testified in an absolute manner that Amy's mother had coached Amy and that this coaching
would certainly lead to irreparable harm. At no time did he offer the court any testimony of
alternative explanations of the observed behavior, nor did he seem to be aware that there might
be alternative explanations. He interviewed Amy in the presence of both parents, and used
suggestive questioning techniques (Kuehnle, 1998).
This article underscores the importance of being properly trained if you are to enter the
courtroom as an expert. Even though this article was related to a court appointed forensic
evaluator, the same issues apply to any MHP called to testify as an expert witness. Often a MHP
who is testifying in court is both an expert witness and a fact witness. This case also underscores
the importance of keeping those lines clear.
In the case of Dr. Smith, it is clear that he became convinced that Amy's mom was
coaching her to make accusations against her father. He then lost all objectivity, and clearly
even lost sight of his court appointment. He was not working for the father, he was working for
the judge, but instead of contacting the judge when he felt moved to request an emergency
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hearing, he called the father's attorney. Dr. Smith stopped being a court appointed forensic
evaluator, and became an advocate for father's rights.
This ineffective evaluation also points out the importance in being knowledgeable about
CSA. The doctor in this case did not offer any evidence (other than his own opinion) that the
mother in the case had coached Amy. He appeared unaware of the relevant behaviors for which
to look to indicate coaching, not to mention the difficulty of coaching a child at Amy's
particular developmental level. However, now that the child has been confused and subjected to
suggestibility, it is likely that the truth will never be known with any certainty (Kuehnle, 1998).
In describing how an attorney should best utilize an expert witness, Steinhauser (2002)
discusses the different types of witness, and issues that attorneys should consider when
determining how to classify witnesses. The types of witnesses are defined. There is the expert
witness, qualified as such under the applicable rules of evidence, who will be expected to offer
opinions without any personal knowledge of the alleged event. Steinhauser lists ten aspects an
attorney should consider when choosing an expert witness. They include education, practical
experience, specialized training, teaching experience, number and level of publications,
professional accolades, membership in professional organizations, depth of knowledge in the
relevant literature, communicative ability, and prior classification as an expert. The strictly fact
witness is to testify about personal knowledge that they have concerning the issue at hand. There
is a third type, a combination of fact and expert witness, defined as a fact witness who can also
be qualified as an expert.
Steinhauser (2002) discusses particular techniques that are effective, such as deciding
whether the process of having a witness qualified as an expert is necessary. This might occur in
situations when an ER doctor or social worker is to testify strictly to facts. The significance of
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the introduction of this testimony is stated by the author as "the sad reality is that in child
physical and sexual abuse cases, a child's future often depends on the testimony of experts” (p.
202).
Dent and Newton (1994) describe the differing approaches when a MHP is conducting a
clinical versus an evidentiary interview. The article was written for the purpose of shedding light
on the reality that there is no real evidence to indicate which form of interviewing is more
effective. It is acknowledged that the purpose of the two interviews is different. This difference
is attributed to the different goals inherent in each type of interview. The clinical interview is
geared toward understanding what has happened to the child, with an eye toward developing a
treatment plan, but the evidentiary interview is meant to uncover and develop information that
will be admitted into a court of law. The clinical interview is more centered on the child,
focusing only on what the child reports. The evidentiary interview includes at least some form of
assessing the accuracy of what the child reports.
Dent and Newton (1994) refer to the system as it exists in England. There is a policy
there of stopping everything once an allegation of abuse has been made, and involving the
welfare or police immediately. Mississippi does mandate reports of suspected child abuse, but
there is no recognized immediate response. Even following the lawsuit charging the State of
Mississippi with negligently operating MDHS, the agency is still allowed a period of time in
which to respond to allegations of abuse. Ethically we are bound to protect our clients, but
again, if the State chooses not to respond, there is no recourse for the child. In jurisdictions
where the practitioner is to immediately cease interaction with the child, bowing to the
authorities who have both the authority and the resources to investigate the charge, the balancing
act of what role a MHP should take becomes more obvious. There might be disagreements about
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the effectiveness of this approach, but it does avoid the complication of deciding which role the
MHP is to fill.
Bow, Quinnell, Zaroff, and Assemany (2002) researched what procedures were typically
used by psychologists in conducting forensic evaluations in cases of CSA. A review of the
particular procedures utilized is beyond the scope of this project, but a brief synopsis of the
findings will underscore the significance of this issue. The authors note the absence of a specific
guideline for professionals to follow. In addition, they found that research evaluating the
effectiveness of these assessment tools is lacking.
The study surveyed psychologists who conduct CSA forensic evaluations. The majority
of the respondents created their own protocol and did not use many assessment tools. The
authors even pointed out that some of the reported assessment tools were administered
incorrectly. This underscores the need for attention in this area. The legal community turns to
MHPs with a childlike trust, believing that MHPs have some special magic that accurately
assesses this incredibly complex issue, even though there is no evidence that the tools being used
are any more or less indicative of the presence of abuse than not (Bow et al., 2002).
The article does clearly state, however, that a professional acting as a forensic evaluator
should have no previous contact with the case. Bow et al., (2002) state that a forensic evaluator
should be appointed by the court. A distinction is made between sole evaluators and team
approaches. The sole evaluator may be preferred, but, if the evaluator lacks expertise in any
particular area of the evaluation, that portion should be referred to someone who does have the
requisite expertise.
These articles indicate that the safest approach to the question of how to weigh the
different roles a MHP might be asked to assume in a case of CSA, is to separate them
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completely, so as not to blur the lines between potential roles. This does seem academically
wise, but there is no evidentiary basis for this approach leading either to more successful
assessment of CSA, or increased effectiveness of the treatment of the child victim of CSA (Bow
et al. (2002); Dent & Newton, 1994). There is also the issue, in a rural state like Mississippi, of
the difficulty in locating two MHPs to participate in a CSA case. Some areas are lucky to have
even one MHP, much less one who is an expert in the area of forensic evaluation. Then the
question of how to balance these roles moves right back into the forefront. The MHP who works
with victims of CSA would certainly not see any therapeutic benefit in refusing to continue to
work with a child just because he or she happened to be the one to whom the child made a
disclosure, particularly when that MHP is well aware that there will be no other MHP to
forensically evaluate. The advocate who might use that same situation to highlight the plight of
children victims of CSA in rural areas could hardly fail to see this approach as in the best
interests of both children in general as well as individual children in cases of CSA. When a
forensic evaluator chooses to locate in a rural area where there is little or no access to mental
health, how could he or she deny the community the access that is so needed? This, though, puts
the MHP squarely in the position of not being available to conduct a forensic evaluation, as he or
she has already been involved as a clinician.
System Expectations
The previous sections make clear that in the American court system, a child's rights are a
function of their parent's rights, and the child has no independent recourse when those rights
have been violated. The rights of a parent are more or less absolute, outside clear and
convincing evidence that the parents are unfit in some way, and that the only help for a MHP in
these situations is to maintain clear boundaries between the many different roles that might need
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to be filled in a case of CSA. An examination of what exactly is expected from MHPs when
called into this system will finish this review.
There are many issues that arise at the courtroom door. The issues that a review of the
literature indicates to be the most consistent are issues around the admissibility of the testimony
offered by the MHP and issues around the reliability of the child's report. The issue of
admissibility of MHP testimony arises through the argument that the evidence offered would not
rise to the level of admissibility under the standards applied to scientific evidence. There are
also issues surrounding admissibility that gather around the potential suggestibility of the
techniques used, or the absence of any corroborating evidence. The manner in which to deal
with the child's testimony is also an issue. If the child does not testify due to concerns for his
mental health, then the evidentiary rules of hearsay become an issue on one hand, while the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution becomes an issue on the other.
The procedures promulgated by the Mississippi Department of Human Services (MDHS)
will begin the discussion, and then some of the pertinent rules of evidence that come into play in
CSA cases, then relevant case law, followed by articles that address the issues of the
admissibility of mental health testimony, whether as expert or fact witness, and the issues
surrounding the manner in which the court addresses the child's involvement in the case.
Beginning with procedural issues, the MDHS, on its website, states that:
When a report is received, the report is screened by a supervisor to decide whether it
should be investigated. If the report warrants an investigation, it is then assigned to a
worker. First the worker will interview the child privately. Then every member of the
household is seen and interviewed privately. At least one non-family member (teacher,
doctor, etc.) who knows the child is interviewed. When the facts back up an abuse report,
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the Department will make a report to the district attorney within 72 hours. The district
attorney determines whether criminal charges can be filed. (2009)
Mississippi Rules of Evidence (MRE) that are often at issue with cases of CSA, include
MRE 803 which involves hearsay and the many exceptions thereto. At the federal level, the
Supreme Court case of Crawford v. Washington (541 U.S. 36, 2004) discussed issues
surrounding hearsay. Sometimes hearsay testimony can lead to the violation of the Sixth
Amendment right of a defendant to confront witnesses against him or her. In cases of CSA many
times the child victim is not made to testify due to the fact that the child may be further
traumatized by the testimony. This is allowed under MRE 803(25), also known as the tender
years doctrine. Admitting testimony under this exception to the rule against hearsay evidence
can lead to Sixth Amendment issues. The tender years rule is an exception to hearsay in the
MRE, defined as
a statement made by a child of tender years describing any act of sexual contact
performed with or on the child by another is admissible in evidence if: (a) the court finds,
in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and
circumstances of the statement provide substantial indicia of reliability; and (b) the child
either (1) testifies at the proceedings; or (2) is unavailable as a witness: provided, that
when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there
is corroborative evidence of the act. (p. 69).
The tender age of a child has been left to the discretion of the courts. A child under the age of
twelve is presumed to be of a tender age, but a child over the age of fourteen also could be
considered to be of a tender age depending on the specifics of the situation, such as the child's
mental age. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated a three pronged test for the use of this
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rule in the case Foley v. State of Mississippi (914 So.2d 677, 2005). The test includes an initial
finding that the child did disclose some sexual contact, the statement must include factors that
indicate substantial indicia of reliability, and finally, that the child either testify at trial or be
unavailable, and if unavailable, there must be corroborating evidence of the act before the
testimony can be admitted at trial.
There are twelve factors to consider when determining the indicia of reliability, as set
forth in the comment to MRE 803(25).
(1) whether there is an apparent motive on declarant's part to lie; (2) the general character
of the declarant; (3) whether more than one person heard the statements; (4) whether the
statements were made spontaneously; (5) the timing of the declarations; (6) the
relationship between the declarant and the witness; (7) the possibility of the declarant's
faulty recollection is remote; (8) certainty that the statements were made; (9) the
credibility of the person testifying about the statements; (10) the age or maturity of the
declarant; (11) whether suggestive techniques were used in eliciting the statement; and
(12) whether the declarant's age, knowledge, and experience make it unlikely that the
declarant fabricated. (p. 76)
The comment also states that the finding must be made by the court on the record.
Corroborating evidence can be more than eyewitness testimony or physical evidence, and
can also include "confessions, doctors' reports, inappropriate conduct by the child, and other
appropriate expert testimony" (MRE Comment to rule 803(25), p. 76). Often the testimony of
MHPs comes into the courtroom through this exception to the hearsay rule, often offered as the
corroboration requirement under MRE Rule 803(25). Then the issue can turn to the Sixth
Amendment Right of the defendant to confront the witnesses against him or her.
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The Mississippi court will then turn to standards set by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Crawford (2004), which states that any evidence testimonial in nature must be cross-examined
by the defendant before it can be admissible. Mississippi courts have held that testimonial in
nature refers to any statements made by the declarant at the behest of someone for the purpose of
gathering evidence to be used to help convict the defendant. Statements made to MHPs in
clinical sessions with children and statements made to medical professionals who are working to
treat the child by keeping him or her safe are not considered to be testimonial in nature. When
parents engage various professionals in the course of the case, these professionals are not
considered to be working to convict the defendant, but are considered to be working to treat the
child. (Anthony v. Mississippi, Court of Appeals of the State of Miss, 2007; Bishop v.
Mississippi, 982 So.2d, 371, MS 2008)
Turning to scientific evidence, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (509 U.S. 579, 1993) recognized that the Federal Rules of Evidence were
to determine whether or not scientific evidence could be admissible in a court of law. The case
is the initial recognition that judges should be gatekeepers of expert/scientific testimony,
requiring that the science involved be relevant and reliable. The Court felt that federal judges
would be up to the task of determining whether the science in question meets the standard. In
assessing this, the following factors are considered: 1) has the science been tested, 2) is this a
theory that has been peer reviewed and published, 3) is there a known error rate, 4) if there are
recognized standards in the practice, and 5) if the approach is generally accepted in the field in
question (Daubert V. Merrell Dow, 1993). This case left some unanswered questions however,
and soon the U.S. Supreme Court followed with Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael (526 U.S.
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137, 1999). In this case the Court tightened what had become a loophole, holding that testimony
of a technical nature, involving specialized knowledge, also falls under the Daubert holding.
In Mississippi, the MRE, specifically rule 702, addresses this issue. The rule states
if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. (p. 56)
The rule was amended in 2003 to keep in step with the US Supreme Court holdings in Daubert
and Kumho. This amounts to the judge being the determinant of whether the proposed scientific
evidence is both relevant and reliable.
As the previous cases show, the application of the rules in CSA can be very complicated.
The complications can be shown by the application of the rules in New York Family Court. The
evaluation may deepen the understanding of system expectations, and highlight the conflict that
often exists in CSA cases between justice and fairness.
Levine and Battistoni (1991) evaluated cases heard within the family court system in the
state of New York to explore the application of rules of evidence when dealing with CSA. The
article reported several issues that are common with cases of CSA, such as hearsay evidence, the
use of the preponderance of evidence standard as it exists in family court, and the introduction of
expert witness testimony.
Levine and Battistoni (1991) were aware of issues that created "frustration and distress"
(p. 20) in attempting to address CSA. The difficulty of requiring corroborating evidence in
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addition to the child's report was recognized. The legal implications of a finding of abuse within
the family court system might not lead to criminal sanctions, but the impact can be just as
significant. The authors felt that the greater discretion used by family court judges can increase
the likelihood of false findings of child abuse, because the family court judges are not held to the
more stringent requirements of a criminal court. Although there was recognition that the less
stringent application was related to the need to protect children from abuse, the authors point out
that the primary point of due process is for the system to guard against mistaken conviction.
The fact that courts had allowed expert testimony, but still required other evidence of the
abuse as corroboration was discussed. There was an indication that the lack of consistently
applied approaches within the mental health community in working with CSA should be more
rigorously examined by family court judges in New York (Levine & Battistoni, 1991).
Hearsay testimony, often a serious issue in cases of CSA, also was discussed (Levine &
Battistoni, 1991). Usually this appears as the child's statements being introduced into evidence
through the testimony of another, often a MHP. There is most often a need for corroborating
evidence in this situation as well. However, two cases were mentioned in which the court had
determined that the hearsay evidence was sufficient to allow for a finding of abuse.
Levine and Battistoni (1991) discussed a psychologist's testimony that a child had been
sexually abused by the father. The testimony was based entirely on things that took place during
treatment sessions. No other evidence was offered, and the appeals court found that this was
acceptable in this case, even though the higher court acknowledged the due process issue,
because the quality of the expert's testimony was satisfactory.
Another case allowed for the corroboration to be achieved through the bootstrapping of
two hearsay statements made to a police officer by two siblings. Bootstrapping refers to the use
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of two separate statements to come to one conclusion, where neither statement would lead to that
conclusion on its own. The judge in that case acknowledged that if the case had involved two
separate statements by one child it would not have been sufficient, but because there were two
independent statements by two children, the corroboration was satisfactory. The article also
included a case in which a child's unsworn statements outside the courtroom were admitted. The
statements were offered within the judge's chambers, in the presence of the attorneys involved in
the case, but the child had not been given an oath (Levine & Battistoni, 1991).
The case of White v. Illinois (1992), 112 S. Ct. 736 was discussed by Kermani (1993).
There have been changes regarding this issue since that time, but the findings are of historical
significance, and offered here to further define the background of the formation of the issues that
develop in cases of CSA. This case involved a child whose abuse was discovered by a
babysitter, almost immediately following the incident. The babysitter became aware that the
child was upset, and when asked, the child reported that a neighbor had touched her
inappropriately. The child repeated the accusations, almost verbatim, to the mother, who called
the police, and the child then repeated the accusation to the investigating officer.
When the case came before the Supreme Court of the United States, the main issue
involved the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness, as the child in this case
did not testify. The court recognized the significance of the constitutional issue, but decided that
the child's virtually identical repeated statements, so close in proximity to the event, created
sufficient reliability to justify the introduction of the hearsay testimony without requiring the
testimony of the child (Kermani, 1993).
Kermani (1993) suggested that this created a situation in which MHPs involved in cases
of CSA should pay particular attention to the statements that the child makes. It would seem to
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be important to recognize that the need for evidence corroborating the statement becomes more
important the farther from the event the statement is made. The same situation occurs when the
child has made differing statements to different individuals, which often occurs in cases of CSA.
Grove and Barden (1999) discuss the standard for admitting scientific expert testimony
into evidence in courtrooms. The Duabert/Kumho standard is specified, as set out in several
cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(1993), the court moved away from the previously established Frye standard, and held that
judges should serve as gatekeepers responsible for excluding evidence that might be considered
"junk science" (Grove & Barden, 1999). In examining a judge's admission of expert testimony, a
court of appeals should "apply an abuse-of-discretion standard" (p. 225) as decided in General
Electric Co. v. Joiner (522 U.S. 136, 1997). Closing out the cases, is Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., et al.
v. Carmichael et al. (1999), which did away with a distinction between expert scientific evidence
and evidence that might be skill based or technical in nature.
Grove and Barden (1999) listed six questions that should be asked by a court when
considering the admissibility of expert witness testimony.
1. Is the proposed theory, on which the testimony is to be based, testable (falsified)?
2. Has the proposed theory been tested using valid and reliable procedures and
with positive results?
3. Has the theory been subjected to peer review?
4. What is the known or potential error rate of the scientific theory or technique?
5. What standards, controlling the techniques; operation, maximize its validity?
6. Has the theory been generally accepted as valid in the relevant scientific
community? (p. 226)
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The authors added another consideration, "Do the expert's conclusions reasonably follow
from applying the theory to the case?" (p. 226). The application of these questions was then
applied to the possible admissibility of evidence related to a Rorschach test, and the possible
admissibility of a diagnosis of either Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), or Dissociative
Identity Disorder (DID). The authors concluded that the admissibility of evidence in any of
these situations, if the Duabert/Kumho standard was rigorously applied, would be doubtful.
Grove and Barden (1999) went so far as to state that they would consider it unethical for
a MHP to offer testimony that would not meet the Daubert/Kumho standard. There was
discussion of the controversy that sometimes accompanies Rorschach testing which led to the
determination that this testimony should not be admitted. The authors also suggested that if the
Rorschach, which has been extensively tested, failed to meet the Daubert/Kumho standard, any
other projective technique would likely meet the same fate.
The use of the DSM as evidence that a particular disorder actually exists was also on the
author's list of evidence that should not be admitted under a stringent application of
Daubert/Kumho. The reasons behind the development of the DSM, as well as the disclaimers
that they are merely a catalogue to help MHPs communicate more effectively when discussing
symptoms was used to reach this conclusion (Grove & Barden, 1999).
Murrie, Martindale, and Epstein (2009) continue in the same vein. Although this article
did apply the Duabert/Kumho standard, the application of twelve standards developed by
Melton, Petrila, Poythress, and Slobogin (as cited in Murrie, Martindale, & Epstein, 2009) were
applied as well. These factors were developed as a guideline to be used by forensic evaluators
when choosing assessment techniques. The twelve factors are as follows
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1. What is the construct to be assessed?
2. How directly does the instrument assess the construct of interest?
3. Are there alternative methods that assess the construct of interest in more direct
ways?
4. Does the use of this instrument require an unacceptable degree of inference
between the construct it assesses and the relevant psychological issues?
5. Is the instrument commercially published?
6. Is a comprehensive user's manual available?
7. Have adequate levels of reliability been established?
8. Have adequate levels of validity been demonstrated?
9. Is the instrument valid for the purpose for which it will be used?
10. What are the qualifications necessary to use the instrument?
11. Has the instrument been subject to peer review?
12. Does the instrument include measures of response style? (p. 398)
Murrie et al. (2009) noted that even though most projective techniques failed to meet the
above standards, many projective techniques were used when assessing cases of CSA. They
specifically discussed the use of sand tray and sand play techniques, along with projective
drawings. The use of sand tray and sand play techniques was found to be ambiguous, and
neither empirically supported in general use, nor in specific use when assessing CSA.
The use of projective drawings was also found lacking, although it was recognized as a
popular technique. The reasons given were that the use of projective drawing is based only on
theory, and had none of the necessary normative qualities of a standardized test, and little data
was available regarding the validity of these techniques.

51

Another issue of concern in cases of CSA is the suggestibility of children as witnesses, as
addressed by Rosenthal (2002). Rosenthal states the importance of this issue.
When accusations are not freely or spontaneously disclosed by a child, it is crucial to
know the methods by which they were produced. This is because, as the scientific
research shows, certain methods of questioning have the power to compromise the
accuracy of children's reports and even cause children to report having experienced
events that never occurred. (p. 338)
Interview characteristics that indicate suggestibility were given. These included
interviewer bias, interviews conducted by adults with high status, the repetition of questions,
misleading questions, repeated interviews, peer pressure, stereotype induction, the use of forcedchoice answer questions, and the use of rewards or punishment (Rosenthal, 2002). The presence
of bias on the part of the interviewer is particularly prominent, as this will usually result in the use
of some of the other techniques listed; such as asking the same question until the expected
answer is given, inducing the stereotype of the alleged perpetrator as a bad person, the use of
questions that are not open ended which direct the child to the desired answer, as well as the use
or threatened use of punishment if the child does not tell the truth.
Rosenthal (2002) discusses the Sixth Amendment Constitutional rights afforded the
defendant in a criminal case of CSA. His position is that the unreliable aspect of a child's
statement, once subjected to suggestive interviewing, makes it inadmissible as evidence. The
arguments that should be made to exclude the evidence, and ways to establish the suggestibility
of the interview are outlined. Rosenthal makes a point to recognize that adults of high status i.e.,
police officers and MHPs, who use these techniques often think they are being helpful, so notes
of the interview will probably include the suggestible questions used. The author makes an
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important point, however, in that the legal system is expected to be above the passions released
by a particular issue, and that the people who are most in favor of admitting evidence tainted by
suggestibility are the prosecutors. Rosenthal (2002) ends by stating
But our judicial system is based on the Constitution and is designed to apply the law with
an even hand, providing an assurance of fundamental fairness, equal protection, and due
process to every defendant, regardless of the particular passions or prejudices of any
given moment. Just as the law does not permit children who have been victimized to be
ignored, it does not allow unequal access to constitutional protections. (p. 369)
Schreiber (2000) conducted a study concerning the suggestibility factor within allegations
of abuse within a day care center. Suggestibility within suspected cases of CSA within day care
centers is particularly problematic. The children are often interviewed repeatedly, by many
different adults, some of whom are not trained in dealing with these cases, and the issue of peer
pressure is more evident due to the number of children involved. Very often in these cases the
children's testimony is the only evidence, which leads to a possible situation of bootstrapping
hearsay as corroboration.
The case Schreiber (2000) used involved Kelly Michaels. She was a day care worker at a
day care center in New Jersey. She left the day care for a better paying job, and then one boy,
while having his temperature taken rectally, mentioned to the pediatrician that "that's what my
teacher does to me at school" (p. 197). The case developed from this point, ending in Kelly
Michaels being charged with 163 counts of sexually abusing a child. She was found guilty on
115 charges. After five years in jail, her conviction was dismissed, and she was released. The
appellate court held that "the prosecution must show that despite suggestive interviewing
techniques; the children's testimonies were still sufficiently reliable" (p. 197).
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Schreiber (2000) compared twenty transcribed interviews in the Kelly Michaels case, and
twenty transcribed interviews taken by DHS workers in New Mexico involving single incident
cases of suspected CSA. The findings were that almost all interviews, whether in day care cases
or single incident cases, used more yes/no questions than research indicates as appropriate. The
significant differences between the interviews were related to interviewing techniques used.
These included multiple interviews, more use of allowing the interviewee to know what other
children had said, and multiple interviewers present within one interview.
This study is an important one relating to the necessity of having trained interviewers
involved in cases of CSA. This case is a good example of how convoluted such cases can
become. The inclusion of the suggestive interviews with this population of children so taints
their statements, that the truth of this alleged situation can only be known by Kelly Michaels.
The importance of educating those who will inevitably become involved in cases of CSA
becomes evident.
Piper (2008) also addresses attorneys that work with cases of CSA. The author outlines
several issues that are particularly prevalent in these cases, and that should be thoroughly
understood by attorneys. These include the difficulty in defining sexual abuse, the question of
validity and reliability of clinical judgments regarding CSA, factors that influence clinical
judgment, the lack of "valid, generally accepted profiles of the child victim or of the perpetrator"
(p. 278), issues surrounding the disclosure of abuse, and the use of projective techniques to
assess CSA. There is also a discussion of issues surrounding the medical exam, but these are not
relevant here.
The forensic interview is discussed. Piper (2008) suggests two to three interviews,
although admits that sometimes more are necessary. The dangers of repeated interviews as to the
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suggestibility issue are pointed out. There is also the inclusion of the danger involved when
parents continually interrogate the child. The suggestion that the interview take place as soon as
possible following a child's disclosure, as well as the importance of being aware of potential
interviewer bias was made. It also was suggested that structured protocols be utilized.
Piper (2008) also made suggestions on evaluating the veracity of the statements of
children regarding CSA. These included the presence of multiple encounters between the child
and the abuser, whether the allegation was made by a parent or the child directly, the inclusion in
the disclosure that the alleged perpetrator requested that the abuse remain a secret, the use of
manipulation to maintain secrecy, consistency in the details, and idiosyncratic details that are
unique to the child's experience.
Another important person to consider within the courtroom is the judge. Connolly, Price,
and Gordon (2009) conducted a qualitative study, with a grounded theory approach, to study
judicial reactions to CSA in Canada. The study focused on 87 cases referred to as historical
child sexual abuse (HCSA) defined as reports of abuse that had occurred more than two years
prior to disclosure.
The application of a coding system developed four themes that were present in the
decisions. These were judicial comments related to the memory of the event, the reliability of
the evidence, the credibility of the complainant, and judicial inferences which were judicial
comments made for which there was no direct evidence (Connolly et al., 2009). Issues of note
within each theme also were described.
The memory of the event included comments regarding the specific details remembered,
the general details remembered, and failures of memory. The reliability theme included
comments regarding inconsistent statements, presence or absence of corroboration and the
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quality of the evidence. The credibility theme included comments related to the behavior of the
complainant in relation to or in close proximity to the alleged abuse, their behavior regarding the
disclosure, and the behavior exhibited at trial. The theme of credibility resulted in the
development of both properties and dimensions. In relation to the actual incident, the judges
made comments regarding the behavior of the complainant after the incident, and also the level
of resistance displayed by the complainant. In regards to the disclosure, there were comments
related to the reason for the delay in disclosure, possibility for collusion related to the disclosure,
any motive to fabricate, reports of others regarding the complainant's behavior at the time of the
alleged abuse, and any reasons that initiated a present need for disclosure (Connolly et al., 2009).
The results indicated that the judges were more aware of the issues within cases of CSA
than the researchers expected. "For the most part, factors that influence verdicts in HCSA
criminal cases are supportable with empirical research and consistent with high court rulings"
(Connolly et al., p. 119). The most frequent comments were related to issues of memory,
followed by credibility. Almost each case had at least one judicial inference, but these were not
overly significant.
One concern, however, was that the judges showed pronounced interest in the behavior of
the child at or near the time of the alleged event. The authors point out that there is no scientific
evidence that there is any significant probative value to this behavior. Connolly et al. (2009)
noted that there was no significant relationship between these comments and case outcome, but
still were concerned that the comments were made at all. The suggestion was made that
evidence related to the complainant's behavior at the time of the abuse not be admitted into
evidence at trial.
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In a case study that involved the introduction of videotaped sessions of Play Therapy,
Snow, Helm, and Martin (2004) discussed the introduction of this evidence in a court case
involving a three year old child who had experienced physical abuse at the hands of his mother
and her boyfriend. The authors outlined four purposes for the testimony of the Play Therapist:
to establish a therapeutic relationship between the therapist and Jamie, which allows for
testimony concerning the psychological trauma experienced by Jamie; to verify the
occurrence of further trauma should Jamie have to testify; to clarify the purpose of play
therapy; and to describe the videotape and interpret the meaning of the play themes. (p.
80)
The introduction of the videotape served the purpose of showing the child to the jury, and
allowing the jury to see the extent of the child's fear, as well as to let the jury get a sense of the
child's vulnerability.
The case did have corroborating evidence. There were graphic pictures of the injuries the
child suffered, and comments to others before he entered the therapeutic relationship with the
Play Therapist, but Snow et al. (2004) suggested that the impact of the videotaped session could
not be overstated. This allowed the jurors to see that the child was still suffering and vulnerable
more than five months after the attack. The accused perpetrators were found guilty and
sentenced to the maximum sentence of twenty years without the possibility of parole.
The tender age of this child underscores the need for some level of child advocacy. He
would not only have been further traumatized by the experience of testifying, but would very
likely have been unable to effectively report on the abuse that he suffered. This made the
evidence of the videotape even more significant, as it was not emotionless or removed from the
actual event, and shows those who work in this field the importance of bringing the child's
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experience into the courtroom (Snow et al., 2004). One of the most fundamental rights that
Americans have is the right to equal protection under the law. This case study highlights the
need for clarification of how exactly to protect the rights of a child who can neither appreciate
the right nor advocate for its application in his or her case.
Two articles that described the legal system's procedures in other countries are offered to
compare and contrast with the system as it is applied within the United States. Myklebust and
Bjorklund (2009) endeavored to compare field investigative interviews with children in CSA
cases with the case outcome. The study took place in Norway, where the rules do not require a
child to testify in cases of CSA. In such cases what is referred to as a field interview can be the
most important evidence. All field interviews are videotaped and presented to the court.
Myklebust and Bjorklund (2009) took one hundred interviews and used a scoring system
that counted the number of words the child used to reply to the interview questions. This was the
dependent variable, with case outcome and gender as independent variables. There were three
levels of the independent variable of possible outcomes in the case, conviction, acquittal, or
insufficient to proceed. ANOVA and Chi Square were the primary statistical tests run, with post
hoc on the ANOVA.
The study found a significant relationship between the number of words used by the child
and conviction. There was an even more dramatic relationship between “old girls” (defined by
the study as over girls over the age of ten) and conviction. In the population of girls over ten
there were no acquittals. This population also had the highest mean number of words used in
response during the field interview. As this was an unexpected finding, the authors encouraged
further research on this possible issue (Myklebust & Bjorklund, 2009).
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The article describes Norway's system such that it becomes clear that the child is
uniformly protected from testifying in court. The field interview is standardized and
administered by professionals specifically trained in performing the interview. Introduction of
the videotaped interviews is par for the course, and the need for corroboration is not as
pronounced. This approach would simplify some of the complexities that exist within our own
system. Corroborating evidence is always an issue in our cases, allowing the child not to testify
can rise to the level of a Constitutional issue, and there is no accepted standard interview used in
all cases of CSA. The issue of hearsay is also minimized in Norway‟s system.
In the United Kingdom, Ryan and Wilson (1995) describe the rules of evidence related to
CSA cases in the United Kingdom. There were three issues unique to the UK discussed by the
authors who then argued that Nondirective Child Centered Play Therapy (NCCPT) was an
excellent fit for therapists to use when working with a child whose case might end up in court.
The article addresses changes that had taken place within statutes in the UK regarding the
prosecution of CSA. One change involved recognition that there was a need to protect a child's
rights, or at least to be sure the child's wishes within specific situations were known. This led to
the court turning to MHPs to determine what those wishes might be. There was also recognition
of the danger of suggestibility in interviews conducted when investigating CSA, which led to the
development of guidelines to be used in such situations. At the same time, the rules regarding
the introduction of a child's testimony at trial had become more flexible (Ryan & Wilson, 1995).
One issue that developed in the UK that is not apparent in our system, is the court's
resistance to having children who are alleged victims of CSA in therapy before the case goes to
trial. Although Ryan and Wilson (1995) point out that there is no law against a child receiving
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therapy before court, it is frowned upon. This approach is taken due to the desire to protect the
child's statements from possible effects of suggestibility.
The qualitative methodology that will be used to examine the judicial perception of
MHPs who are called to testify in court will now be outlined. In conducting interviews with
judges specifically regarding the manner in which they interpret and implement procedures
within cases of CSA, I hope to add some clarity to the many complex issues involved
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Chapter Three
METHODOLOGY
Research Design
The research design for this study was qualitative. The methodology was
phenomenological. The most adept way to attempt to increase knowledge that will lead to more
effective MHP involvement in cases of CSA is to interview those most directly involved in the
application of the rules that exist within the social construct of a courtroom, specifically, judges.
My goal was to work to “reduce the textural and structural meanings of experiences”
(Creswell, 2007, p. 234) of judges within CSA cases in such a way as to increase the
understanding of MHPs of the crucial aspects of these cases that are central to the judicial
experience. An understanding of the judicial perception of MHPs involved in CSA cases will
allow MHPs to more effectively understand how to better represent their clients within cases of
CSA.
I used interviews with willing participants. The interviews were recorded and
transcribed. I kept a field journal to record immediate reactions to the interview, as well as a
separate reflective journal to record and maintain any reactions or observations I made during the
data analysis. The reason for the two journals was to create a procedure that gave me an
opportunity to recognize any of my own biases that become evident in this study I think that my
awareness of the increased emotional charge that accompanies CSA created a need for an
internal check in order to minimize the effect of possible emotional reaction on the data analysis.
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The transcriptions, field journal, and reflective journal were coded on an ongoing basis for
indexing purposes.
Participants
The population for this study was judges within the State of Mississippi who have some
jurisdictional involvement with CSA, and experience with MHPs in the courtroom. This could
include Chancery Judges and County/Youth Court Judges, and/or Youth Court Referees. There
are twenty Chancery Court districts within Mississippi, with forty-nine Chancery Court Judges
throughout the state. There are eighty-two counties within Mississippi, and each county will
have either a County Judge or a Chancery Judge who will serve as a Youth Court Judge. It is
also possible that there is an appointed Youth Court Referee. Mississippi has one municipal
Youth Court Judge in Pearl, MS (State of Mississippi Judiciary, n.d.). The participants were
chosen from this population.
The method used to recruit participants was purposeful, using a networking approach.
“The idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select participants or sites…that will best
help the researcher understand the problem and the research question” (Creswell, 2009, p. 178).
My experience with cases of child abuse, as well as my contact with other professionals who
have experience with CSA and courtrooms led me to possible participants. I contacted those
professionals to help me develop a list of judges that were most likely to help me understand the
judicial perception of MHPs involved in CSA cases. I chose four to eight judges to interview. I
then personally contacted these judges for the purposes of recruitment into the study (see
Appendix A for recruiting email). This number is in keeping with other studies that have been
conducted using this methodology, and is also suggested by Creswell (2007). I planned to
choose at least one, possibly two, judges to serve as key informants (Patton, 2002); in that the
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interview protocol would be used with the key informants to verify that the interview questions
were effectively written. I intended one key informant to be a judge with whom I was already
familiar, and the other was left open to the possibility that the MHPs that provided me with
suggestions of judges to interview might suggest one as particularly likely to provide me with
rich data. Further discussion of the use of the key informant in this study is given in Chapter
four.
Main Research Question
What is the perception of judges in Mississippi regarding the roles of MHPs in CSA
cases? The complexities that come into play with CSA make this a much more complicated
question than it might initially appear.
One of the things that becomes apparent when doing any study on the literature that
exists regarding this issue, is the innumerable side issues that develop. There are articles that
address being an expert witness (Grove & Barden, 1999; Steinhauser, 2002), some addressing
types of assessment that should be used for court (Murrie, Martindale, & Epstein, 2009;
Schreiber, 2000), some dealing with the clinical issues related to court involvement (Gil, 2002;
Kermani, 1993), and one addressing the use of videotaped sessions (Snow, Helm, & Martin,
2004), but all seem to focus only on one aspect of a CSA case, which can leave questions
regarding other aspects of a CSA case unanswered. It is too ambitious to expect to leave no
questions unanswered, but the daunting task of being able to increase the awareness of
expectations within a case of CSA for MHPs that begins with the initial referral and ultimately,
ideally, ends with the protection of the child is appealing. This is the reason for having only a
single research question, as it is significant enough. The qualitative approach taken will possibly
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lead to other issues, and I will keep an open mind to the potential inclusion of these as research
questions.
Researcher Lens
One aspect common to all qualitative research is that the research cannot be separated
from the researcher (Creswell, 2009; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 2002). Creswell (2009)
states that the researcher's "interpretations cannot be separated from their own backgrounds,
history, contexts, and prior understandings" (p. 176). This creates the necessity that the
researcher continually be aware of his or her own experiences and how these may influence the
interpretation of the data collected. For this reason, a biographical background was included in
Chapter one to clearly delineate the researcher's lens in this study.
Words are not strong enough to convey the importance of protecting children from any
type of abuse. Being an advocate for a cause often evinces the notion that the advocate is
somehow radically invested in the cause, which can detract from the advocacy. At the same
time, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which any one would not agree that protecting
children from abuse is morally significant. I report this because I want to disclose any possible
bias. I took the attitude of objective observer during the interviews, and recorded any reactions
that I had in relation to my bias against child abuse in my field journal, if it happened during an
interview, and my reflective journal if it appeared during the transcription or data analysis, and
used the two journals as a check against each other to reveal bias of which I was not aware.
Maintaining Confidentiality
The interviews were audio taped, but once the tapes were transcribed there was no
identifying information associated with the transcripts. Code names for the participants were
developed, and this list will continue to be kept in a separate location from the transcripts. The
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code names were randomly developed. Because it might be possible to identify a participating
judge based on some of the information within the interview, the transcripts were kept in a
locked cabinet, within a secure room, and all efforts were taken to maintain the integrity and
security of the transcripts. The recordings were deleted once they were transcribed and I
proofread the transcripts for accuracy. Field notes were taken by the researcher, both during the
interview and immediately following. These referred to the participants only by code name, and
contained any reactions that the researcher had to the interview and/or the interviewee. A
reflective journal was maintained, which included reflections and reactions to the transcribed
interviews, any developing themes, and any thoughts or emotions that might reflect possible bias
on my part. The field notes and reflective journal only referred to participants by code name, but
was also maintained in a secure and confidential manner. The participants were informed of any
risks that they might experience as a participant in this study. The participants were informed of
the scope of the study, and the intended use of the results, including their comments. No quotes
were attributed to any participant directly.
Several procedures suggested by Creswell (2009), and Creswell and Miller (2000), were
undertaken to build credibility and trustworthiness. Constant comparison of the coding, as
represented by memos of the definitions of themes, was maintained within the reflective journal.
An audit trail was created by the reflective journal. A member check in which the judges were
given a chance to comment on summaries of the field journal entries regarding their interviews
was conducted. The use of thick description was used to ensure that the reader fully appreciates
the process, and can judge the applicability of the data to other jurisdictions. All recognized
researcher bias was disclosed, and an external auditor was consulted to endeavor to uncover any
hidden bias. Any outlying data developed was presented in full.
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Interview Protocol
The interview protocol was developed following Creswell's (2007) format. The time and
place of the interview was documented, along with a description of the particular judge's
position, such as Circuit Court Judge, County/Youth Court Judge, or Chancellor. I initiated the
interview by introducing myself, and providing enough personal background to make the judge
aware of the aspects of my personal story that were relevant to this project, such as my education
and professional experience. I explained the taping procedure, and the steps that were taken to
insure confidentiality. I explained to the judge that The University of Mississippi Institutional
Review Board approved the study, and how the judge might contact the IRB if desired (see
Appendix B for consent form). Following these remarks, I asked the judge if he or she had any
questions or comments. I then explained the purpose for the research, and asked for any initial
comments that the judge might like to make, and if there were any questions before we began the
interview.
The interview questions were open-ended. Follow-up questions were based on
interviewee comments that were unclear or incomplete. I asked a final question specifically
about the interviewee's perception of Play Therapy as a means to begin to develop further
research.
The initial question was geared toward the judge's perception of the role MHPs play in
cases of CSA. Several additional questions were asked to gather more specific information
regarding the participant's understanding of the rights of the child and parent, and a final
question specifically regarding the participant's awareness and perception of Play Therapists as
MHPs. I included suggested follow up questions, but these were also based on the judge's initial
response.
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The interview questions were as follows:
Question one: What do you think the roles of MHPs in cases of CSA are?
Follow up to Question one:
How should MHPs balance the role between clinician and witness?
Question two: What is the role of the MHP regarding children's rights in cases of CSA?
Follow up to Question two:
How would you describe a child's rights in cases of CSA?
Question three: What is the role of the MHP regarding parental rights in cases of CSA?
Follow up to Question three:
How would you describe these rights?
Does that change if the parent is the suspected perpetrator?
Question four: Is the credibility of a MHP affected by their role as a child advocate?
Question five: Are you familiar with Play Therapy as a modality for treating
children?
Follow up to question five:
Is the credibility of a MHP affected by their use of Play Therapy?
At the close of the interview, I thanked the judge for his or her time, and asked the judge
if there were any comments that he or she would like to make that were not covered by the
questions asked. I also confirmed the process by which the judge could check my interview
summary (see Appendix C for member check email).
Data Analysis
Michrina and Richards (1996) refer to the following process of analysis when
undertaking a phenomenological approach to qualitative research. The first analysis compares
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the ideal culture versus the culture as it exists. The ideal culture in this instance was defined by
statute and the literature review. The real culture was that culture that became apparent in the
interviews. The next level of analysis included any significant events that were common to the
participants (Michrina & Richards, 1996). Presiding over cases of CSA was viewed as a shared
experience, which was used as the basis of analyzing the phenomenon of the judicial perception
of MHPs in CSA. My understanding of this phenomenon was increased by the view of the
judges' experience as a shared event.
Analyzing the process of change as it occurs in this judicial culture was undertaken. The
responsibilities of judgment can be unsettling. "A transformation that takes place over a length
of time"(Michrina & Richards, 1996, p. 87) very likely occurs during the performance of this
job. I was attuned to issues of process in my analysis. This was an important step because it
helped me understand that there is an essential aspect of this phenomenon that is related to
amount of experience, or possibly type of court the judge presides over, which helped develop
some themes. It was also an assumption on my part that the more experienced judges are more
open to MHPs, and this approach helped control for this assumption.
Analysis of the participant‟s emotions was included as well (Michrina & Richards, 1996).
Emotions are not usually associated with courtrooms; however, one of the reasons that cases of
CSA are so complex is due to the emotions unleashed by this unconscionable act. During the
interview the interviewer paid close attention to nonverbal cues regarding emotion, being certain
to verify any interpretations of same, while also closely attending to any statements regarding
emotional reaction by the interviewee. Particular attention was paid to any indication of the
judge's awareness of the emotional impact of CSA on both the child and family of the victim.
Any metaphors used by the judges within the interview process were closely considered. These
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were recorded by the researcher within the field notes immediately following the interview. Any
themes that appear to be related to emotional reactions were specified as such within the
developed constructs.
The data was coded using a bracketing approach as described for data analysis in
phenomenology by Patton (2002). The data was reviewed as close to immediately following an
interview as possible. As soon as any themes became evident, the data was coded in that
manner, and the development of the subthemes and definitions of the themes followed. The field
notes were analyzed to protect against researcher bias, but also to uncover reactions that might
verify the themes uncovered. Memos were included in the reflective journal to maintain an
ongoing record of the continual analysis.
IRB Protocol
The protocol established by the Institutional Review Board at The University of
Mississippi was followed. The application was filed as soon after the prospectus was approved
as possible. The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 45, Part 46, Section 46.101, b(3), exempts
human subjects that are elected or appointed public officials (United States Department of Health
& Human Services, 2009). The IRB policy at The University of Mississippi is broader, and
covers all research that involves human subjects. The inclusion of public officials in the
performance of their duties qualified as an exempt review. All application procedures were
followed as per the protocol established by the University of Mississippi.
Chapter four contains descriptions of the issues and themes that developed. Chapter five
discusses the findings.

69

Chapter Four
FINDINGS
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to increase knowledge of the judicial perception of Mental
Health Professionals (MHPs) who testify in cases of child sexual abuse (CSA). The primary
research question was: What is the perception of judges in Mississippi regarding the roles of
MHPs in CSA cases? The findings of this phenomenological study are presented in this chapter.
The findings include a summary of the population from which the participants were chosen, a
summary of each participant, the process and results of the data analysis, along with the
emergent themes.
Study Revisions
The original design included the use of one or two key informants as a method for
verifying the adequacy of the interview questions. In beginning to undertake the study, there
was difficulty in making contact with the judge to be used as a key informant. The other judges
were contacted, and began to agree to participate. Interviews were scheduled so that the judges
who had agreed to participate would not be inconvenienced. The initial interview indicated that
the questions produced the data intended, and for this reason, no key informant was used.
As the study proceeded it became apparent that the use of CSA as a delimitation might
not have been necessary. Even though the interviews were conducted with this delimitation
expressly in mind, the participants did not disclose any particular difference toward cases of
CSA. The judges viewed all court issues related to children equally.
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Participant’s Summary
Demographics
The study participants were recruited from the population of judges within Mississippi
who have some jurisdictional relationship to cases that involve CSA. Of the five judges
interviewed, none were currently involved in criminal matters regarding CSA. Although
criminal cases are significant to the prosecution of those who sexually abuse children, those
cases tend to focus more on the rights of the alleged perpetrator, and less on the child. In
Mississippi, non-criminal courts that have jurisdictional issues with CSA would include
Chancery judges, also called Chancellors, and County/Youth Court Judges. This led to a
possible population of eighty County/Youth Court Judges and forty-nine Chancellors.
I obtained a list of judges that had been involved in MHP testimony in cases of CSA by
asking other MHPs to suggest judges before whom they had testified. This process led to a list
of twelve judges, of whom five agreed to be interviewed.
To maintain the confidentiality of my participants, the demographics of the judges are
described separately from the description of the interviews. It is possible that the judges could
be recognized if described in conjunction with their geographical locations and their
demographic information. The pseudonyms used for each judge were chosen based on random
observations I made during the interview.
The participants included two women, one Caucasian, and one African American, and
three Caucasian males. The experience levels included one who was newly elected, one with
seventeen years of experience, one with eight years of experience, one with five years of
experience, and one with nine years of experience. I have reported the years of experience based
on the year the judge was elected, as provided by the website of the Mississippi Secretary of
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State. All of the judges had experience in the courtroom as attorneys who had also dealt with
cases involving the alleged sexual abuse of children. The participants sometimes referred to
their years of experience in this area, and often included time spent as a county prosecutor or as a
practicing attorney. These differences will be noted during the interview summaries. The
judges‟ previous experiences included extensive experience with family law, many years as a
prosecuting attorney, mediation, and specially appointed Youth Court Referee.
The participants were offered the option of a member check in a researcher developed
summary of the interview. Only one participant chose to take this option. The summary of this
interview is included in Appendix D.
One interview took place in the Pine Belt region of the state. The town was small, with a
population of 6600, but located in close proximity to a major city in Mississippi. Two judges
were located in a larger town in North Central Mississippi, population 26,000. One judge was
located in a small rural town in Southwest Mississippi, population 2000. One judge was located
in a larger city, in Central Mississippi, population 26,000. There were three Chancellors and two
County/Youth Court Judges. The newly elected judge was included as a participant based on the
fact that the judge's previous experience focused on family law, and this judge had been very
involved with the testimony of MHPs. The participant summaries will not include gender or race
information as this would make them readily identifiable.
Individual Summaries
Judge Bush
The first participant was a chancellor, newly elected to the bench. Judge Bush was
admitted to the Mississippi Bar in 1989. The judge's previous experience was extensively within
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the family law area, with a great deal of interaction with MHPs. There were plaques on the
office wall indicating honors achieved through the Mississippi Bar.
The judge displayed passion about the topic discussed. There was also a great deal of
general knowledge about this issue that encompassed awareness of relevant incidents that had
occurred throughout The State of Mississippi. The overall impression was of a professional who
had managed to learn the ropes, while remaining open to new possibilities.
Judge Fom
Judge Fom did not initially respond to my request. Before I reached the point of a second
request, however, I received an email apologizing for the delay in response, and a willingness to
be interviewed. Judge Fom reports around five years of experience as a chancellor. The judge
had very definite opinions about certain issues, and experience with custody issues created
emotional responses in this interview.
The overall impression was that this judge had a desire to be as fair as possible, and
worked to be aware of the perceptions of all parties before the court. This attitude creates
openness to unique suggestions. There was one situation relayed during the interview that
posited this creative approach to cases. This judge had experience in both mediation and
research, which could arguably create such an attitude. The judge was admitted to the
Mississippi Bar in 1974.
Judge Reed
Judge Reed is the Senior Chancellor for the same Chancery Court as Judge Fom. Judge
Reed has seventeen years on the bench. The judge's previous experience was in private practice
and also as a Special Youth Court Referee. Judge Reed was admitted to the Mississippi Bar in
1980. This judge has achieved recognition for philanthropic activities. The emotional response
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in this interview revolved around MHPs who were biased, or who delivered the opinion of just
one side.
Judge Reed appeared very private, without as much indication of family or personal
interests found in the other offices. Chancellor Reed was highly active. Because Judge Reed
had been called to an emergency hearing that morning, this judge was the only one who came
directly from the courtroom, in full courtroom regalia, to the interview. The overall impression
was that Judge Reed was quintessentially professional. The experience of having been on the
bench since 1994 was evident. There was more of an awareness of the big picture, including
some of the manipulations to which MHPs might be subjected by both attorneys and parents.
Judge Bruth
Judge Bruth was the first County/Youth Court Judge to be interviewed. The judge was
admitted to the bar in 1973, and elected to the bench in 2002. Judge Bruth was very genial,
calm, and gave the appearance of wisdom. This was even reflected in the office, as we did not
sit at or around a desk or table, but in easy chairs. The informal environment was confirmed
when once during the interview a local attorney came in before knocking, quickly apologized,
and backed out. The judge‟s interview indicated an interest in making sure that the system
worked as effectively as possible. This judge followed cases to their conclusion, mentioning
situations that had come up in the area, including the final outcome, even when this occurred in
another court.
The overall impression was that this judge was exceptionally evenly tempered. There
was pride in the accomplishments of the jurisdiction. There was a general air of confidence that
the system worked. The judge was, however, very aware of the difficulties presented by cases of
CSA.
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Judge Reeves
Judge Reeves was elected as a County/Youth Court Judge in 2003. The judge‟s previous
experience was an extensive period as the county prosecutor, which led the judge to report
twenty-two or so years of experience with CSA. The judge was admitted to the Mississippi Bar
in 1977. This judge was very direct and to the point. The emotional responses here were not as
evident. Judge Reeves‟ attitude was all business, occasionally giving one word answers to my
questions. The all business approach was evident in the office as well. There were numerous
chairs with few personal items in the office.
The overall impression was that this judge took the responsibilities of the position very
seriously. There was also a great familiarity with MHPs and attorneys in the area. Judge Reeves
indicated some situations in which the court‟s opinion had been changed due to new
developments. This showed a willingness to continue to view evidence even after the case had
been heard.
Interview Summaries
Judge Bush
The judge's office was still being organized, and there was a lot of activity in the office
while I waited. The judge had been at another meeting in a neighboring town, and was a few
minutes late for the interview. The waiting area in the office was very small, and this allowed
me to interact with the court administrator and assistant who were present and organizing the
office. It was clear that the entire office was excited about their new environment. There was
much laughter, and the two workers were getting to know each other.
When the judge came in, the closeness of the office made it apparent that I was present,
and Judge Bush immediately apologized, and led me into the office. The office was nicely
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appointed, with many personal items, pictures, and honors that the judge had achieved. We sat at
a conference table that was in the center of the room, in front of and perpendicular to the judge‟s
desk. This office had the most room, and was clearly designed for work.
During this initial interview, it was apparent that the interview questions were leading to
the data I was seeking. Judge Bush was very open. The general feel of the interview was that
the issue of MHP involvement in cases of CSA was of concern to this judge, and there was an
awareness of many of the issues that my questions were designed to uncover. Judge Bush's
answers revealed a concern for considering resolutions to issues that were seen as potential
problems, such as possible court appointment of MHPs to avoid bias. In this initial interview I
was not yet aware that each participant would have a similar reaction. They often appeared
confused as to the relevance of the questions regarding rights. As they formulated their answers,
however, the potential issues began to take shape.
Judge Bush also exhibited some emotions when discussing these issues. There were
times that the judge pounded on the table for emphasis, and times that the nonverbal
communication was apparent. Judge Bush was very knowledgeable about statewide issues that
had come to bear on my research focus, even mentioning a MHP who had been found to be
unreliable by the Mississippi Board of Examiners for Licensed Professional Counselors, who
revoked his license. Judge Bush also, as did each judge in turn, mentioned specific cases in
which he or she had been involved. Metaphors were also used, such as "on the same page", and
“put Humpty Dumpty back together again”.
Judge Fom
This office was more settled, but the waiting area was just as small. At this interview, the
courthouse was undergoing renovation, so there were lots of workmen, and construction noise,
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until I entered the inner sanctum of the Chancery Court offices. I was a little early, and Judge
Fom was willing to begin the interview. The office was comfortable, and inviting. There were
family pictures. The office was not cluttered, and appeared orderly. I sat in a chair facing the
judge's desk.
Judge Fom's general approach was amiable and open. The Chancellor got emotional at
some points during the interview, and showed this by pounding on the desk. Judge Fom, as did
the other interviewees, mentioned a particular case, but in this interview the mention was
regarding the behavior of a particular MHP. This MHP had behaved in a particular manner that
the judge thought was impressive. There was a period during the interview that we developed a
better rapport.
I felt that this interview gave me the same information as Judge Bush. There appeared to
be an awareness that judges should be able to rely on MHPs for assistance in these cases, but as
we talked, the participant awareness of the complications that MHPs might face became more
apparent.
Judge Reed
The Senior Chancellor's office was also neat. There were fewer personal items in this
office, but the desk was a little more cluttered. The judge had been called to an emergency
hearing, and appeared in robes. The judge appeared aggravated, which might have been due to
the emergency hearing. I felt pressure not to keep the judge any longer than absolutely
necessary. I also noticed in this interview, that I was feeling a pull toward the answers that I
thought the judge might give. In order to curtail this, I worked to intentionally slow my
responses. I also chose not to study the transcripts until after all the interviews so that I would
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not be as aware of other interviewee responses during each interview. Judge Reed and I did
eventually develop a rapport, and as the interview went on, the judge became more open.
The overall impression I had from this interview, was that this judge was the most
skeptical of MHPs in the interviews to this point. At the same time, Judge Reed also perceived
MHPs as useful to the court, especially when MHPs “talked to more than the child and the
mother.” This judge had the most pronounced reaction to the child's rights question, by
responding “rights to what?” Judge Reed, as did Judge Bush, became less circumspect when the
tape recorder was turned off, and we walked to the door.
Judge Bruth
This office was smaller and older, with no work of any kind underway. There was a
metal detector at the door leading down the hallway, but it was unnecessary to walk through it,
and it was unmanned. There was a large waiting room which I shared with another, who was the
parent of a child before the court. During my wait we discussed the state of today's youth.
Judge Bruth was the first judge I interviewed who was not a Chancellor. Both the style
of the responses and the offices themselves were different. The office was not undergoing any
sort of physical change, but it was still more active. This office had the easiest access to the
people it served, since the judge's office was immediately off the waiting room. There was an
alternate entrance, directly across the hall from the courtroom.
Judge Bruth had a case scheduled for that morning, and thought that we might have to
interrupt our interview for this reason, but the interview was finished before that was necessary.
The overall impression from this interview was that Judge Bruth was very aware of MHPs and
the benefit that could be gained from their testimony. The judge's answers revealed that the

78

limited access to MHPs sometimes led to complications because of the mixing of roles, an issue
that my literature review revealed.
Judge Reeves
The final interview was also conducted with a County/Youth Court Judge. This office
was similar in setup to Judge Bruth's, with a large and active waiting room. There was no
remodeling occurring here either. The security here required that I be buzzed in by a
receptionist. The judge's office was also much more in the regular flow of the courtroom.
On the day of the interview, court was in session, and the offices were teeming with
activity. There were many people coming and going. I was allowed to wait in the "coffee room"
and interacted there with some of the court staff. There was a nice energy, with most everyone
interacting in a collegial way as they passed in the halls, or conferred in offices.
This judge was very short and to the point, initially answering at least two questions with
the word “yes.” There was no need for much prodding, though, and the answers were
expounded upon. The office was more professionally set up, with numerous wingback chairs in
the room. I assumed these were there for potential conferences with families and their attorneys.
This judge had the most pronounced response to the question regarding MHPs credibility
if they were child advocates. This was one of the questions that got an immediate "yes" reply.
The more detailed answer named a specific organization. Judge Reeves also mentioned a MHP
by name, and explained the process that this court used in relation to MHPs more operationally
than in previous interviews.
Process of Analysis
To analyze the data for coding and establishing the themes, the transcripts were read
several times. The initial reading was for the purpose of taking an epoche perspective, as
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described by Patton (2002). I also took note of any metaphors used, indications of shared
experiences, comments that reflected the ideal culture versus the real culture, any emotions
exhibited by the participants, as well as any indication of "a transformation that takes place over
a length of time"(Michrina & Richards, 1996, p. 87), which will be referred to as a CSA process
effect. I felt this would help me read the transcripts without any prejudging, and help me note
any bias on my part. I chose to define metaphor broadly and include commonly used
colloquialisms. A list of these was created in my field journal. The second reading involved
reading the entire transcript from beginning to end, working to establish the themes. I began to
bracket statements and look for similarities within the transcripts. At the end of this reading I
had developed a working list of themes, which was noted in my field journal.
The third reading was a reading to verify the themes I had noted. This reading involved
cutting all the statements from the transcripts and grouping them together into meaningful
clusters (Patton, 2002). The fourth reading involved separating the answer to each question and
putting them together, reading the answers to each question from each participant at once. This
was undertaken to both verify the presence of the themes originally noted, and to note the
similarities in the answers. In a fifth reading, I read the collections of meaningful clusters both
to verify my initial interpretations, and to solidify the themes and subthemes noted. A sixth
reading was undertaken to separate the comments into subthemes through the use of highlighters.
The interview responses were consistent with the information discussed in the literature
review. The awareness of the emotions present in the interviews as well as the process effect of
“a transformation that takes place over time” (Michrina & Richards, 1996, p.87) resulting from
experience with CSA, add depth to understanding to how MHPs should be involved with the
courts. Comments that reflected a difference between the ideal culture and the culture as it exists
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revolved around complexities in CSA cases that can lead to conflicts. All of the participants
evidenced emotion around the issue of child abuse. This seemed to make them more determined
to make decisions in the best interest of the child.
There did appear to be a difference in perception that changed over an amount of time, or
a process effect, but it might be related to experience with CSA as opposed to being a judge.
The participants were on a continuum, with Judge Fom at one end, and Judge Reeves at the
other. Judge Fom has the least experience with CSA, and Judge Reeves the most. Judges Bush
and Bruth were very similar, in the middle, and Judge Reed fell on the end closer to Judge
Reeves. This effect was the most evident between Judges Bush and Fom. Judge Bush has the
least experience as a judge, but extensive experience with CSA, while Judge Fom has more
experience on the bench, but the least of all the participants with CSA. If the process effect had
been a result of the years of experience on the bench, I would expect Judge Bush to be on one
end, but in fact, Judge Bush‟s interview indicates a deeper awareness of the impact of allegations
of CSA on the family and complications that arise in these cases. Judge Fom did not express as
much emotion around CSA, and had fewer responses reflecting the complexities. This effect
was also evidenced in that the three judges on one end of the continuum made even more
comments regarding the impact that family involvement might have on a case. Their
experiential perspective was also deeper. I had assumed that the more experienced judges might
be more open to MHPs, but my findings did not bear that out. The most experienced judges
appeared to also be the most leery about the credibility of MHPs. They also seemed to be the
ones most able to specifically discuss what made an MHP more credible.
During the analysis of the data I was listening for metaphors. The first reading of the
transcripts was for emotion, metaphor, ideal culture vs. real culture, and process effect. Using a

81

broad definition of metaphor, to include colloquialisms, there was not much of interest there.
There were terms used, like “red herring”, “using all the tools in the toolbox”, and “hired gun”,
but nothing that was present for all participants. There was present an idea that MHPs had to be
willing to fight the good fight. Judge Bush discussed being aware that MHPs felt “pulled and
tugged” when called to court, but that it was “imperative” that MHPs be “willing” to testify.
Judge Reeves talked about how important it was for MHP testimony when the evidence was not
clear. Judge Fom mentioned that “it is too important not too” when discussing the need for
MHPs to be open with the court.
Emerging themes
The depiction of the judicial perspective of the MHP role in cases of CSA is complex.
The data indicates that judges are aware of the complexities that exist for MHPs who testify in
court. At the same time, there is an unwavering belief that the task before the court is too
important for MHPs not to give the court information needed to make the best decision for the
child. The themes that emerged were the family, credibility, experiential perspective, and
operational. The first two themes are focused on MHP behavior, while the last two focused on
judicial experiences around CSA.
The family theme is defined as comments made by the participants that represent the
judge‟s perception of the impact of allegations of CSA on members of the family. This includes
comments about the mother, the father, the alleged perpetrator, and the alleged victim. The
subthemes within this theme are the influence of the family over the child, issues unique to
involving children in the judicial process, and the resulting trauma on the child and family from
allegations of CSA. The influence of the family over the child subtheme is defined as comments
referring to judicial awareness of possible ulterior motives that might exist within a family, such
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as the possibility of parental coaching. The issues unique to involving children in the judicial
process subtheme includes statements reflective of the manner in which children‟s involvement
in court can lead to issues that the court must resolve, such as whether or not a child is capable of
effectively testifying. The resulting trauma on the child and the family from allegations of CSA
subtheme includes comments that the participants made that indicated awareness of the impact of
such allegations on the family.
The credibility theme is defined as the participant comments that indicate the judicial
need for MHPs to be trustworthy and believable throughout. The subthemes that developed
within this theme include knowing the system, willingness to participate openly and candidly,
and helping the child. The subtheme of knowing the system represents judicial comments
regarding the participant‟s perception that MHPs need to familiarize themselves with the system
in which they work. The willingness to participate openly and candidly subtheme is defined as
comments that reflect that the participants want to be able to know that MHPs are sharing all
information that could help the judge make decisions that are in the best interest of the child.
The helping the child subtheme represents comments that reflect the participant‟s consistent
focus on what was in the best interest of the child. The application of the best interest of the
child doctrine was apparent throughout the interviews, but this subtheme represents the
comments that most directly communicated the judicial application of the best interests of the
child to cases of CSA that also involved MHP credibility.
The experiential perspective is defined as comments that the participants made in direct
relation to specific judicial experiences regarding CSA. This includes the specific examples of
the behaviors of MHPs with which each participant was familiar. There were no subthemes that
developed within this theme because any attempt to further bracket the data diluted the impact of
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the theme. The importance of leaving the comments in their full context became apparent in the
analysis because the comments here directly describe how the participants perceived MHP
behavior in court.
The operational theme is defined as comments made by the participants that helped
define the rules of the court. The difference between the experiential perspective theme and the
operational theme is subtle, but I think the distinction was important to make. The experiential
perspective theme comments are directly related to personal experiences of the participants. The
operational theme comments are more general in nature, and refer to rules of courts in general.
One theme leads to specific data related to the judicial perception of MHPs in court, while the
other leads to general data on how MHPs are expected to behave in cases of CSA. There were
no subthemes that developed in the operational theme. The same dilution of the data occurred in
the operational theme as it did in the experiential perspective theme, so the comments were left
in full context.
The Family
This theme represents the comments made that describe the judicial perspective of the
family when involved in cases of CSA. The subthemes are the influence of the family over the
child, issues unique to involving children in the judicial process, and the resulting trauma on the
child and the family from allegations of CSA. The judicial perspective of the role of MHPs in
regard to this theme is for the MHP to assess the level of influence of the family on the child‟s
allegation, to be open to possible ulterior motives on the part of one parent or the other, and work
to minimize the impact of the trauma on the child.
The participants all were aware of the influence that families have over the children
victims of CSA. Judge Reeves said “I‟ve got most of my parents prohibited from seeing the
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child pending the investigation. I don‟t want them offering to buy the child a four-wheeler, or
send them to Disneyland…I don‟t want any coaching.” Judge Bush referred to needing to know
“to what degree the parents are playing in the allegations.” Judge Reed said that in some cases
“the mother so influences a child‟s testimony that it‟s a blur as to who‟s really testifying.”
The participant comments also revealed a judicial awareness of issues that are unique to
involving children in court. Participant awareness included knowledge that children at different
ages had different issues. Judge Reeves stated
because you take a child that is like seven and younger that starts giving a story. The
story changes. And the story changes not because they are not telling the truth; it‟s just
the mentality of a six or seven year old.
Judge Bush said that “for me to expect that child to just walk in and tell you, well that is
oftentimes indicative of a child that has been coached by mom or dad.” Judge Bruth stated that
I mean very young victims - even with a forensic interview - in some cases you might get
some information, but if they are required to come into court and actually testify - your
chances of getting anybody under ten years old, unless they are extremely articulate or
bright - to be able to properly testify is remote.
Judge Reed said “when you‟re looking at small children, I‟m not sure that they - they can‟t
communicate with you verbally.”
One aspect that appeared in the comments made by the two youth court judges, Judges
Reeves and Bruth, were comments that related to their awareness that older children might be
manipulating the system. Judge Reeves said “I‟ve found over the years, that you get the
children, and they get up to about thirteen or fourteen, and they can be very manipulative, and
say these things - that step daddy molested me - and it‟s absolutely a lie.”
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Judge Bruth put it this way
…in some cases it‟s the child who has the problem, not caused by the parent or the other
person. There are a number of circumstances that we‟ve had where we‟ve identified that
the child is in fact, you know, having mental health issues and some of the things that he
or she is alleging were not factually correct, for one reason or another - either because of
mental health problems or because of personal feelings toward the person who is alleged
to be a perpetrator.
Both Judge Bruth and Judge Reeves pointed out that because the Youth Court‟s primary concern
is the child, that even in these cases the court would act to protect the child, sometimes sending
the child to counseling or just continuing to monitor the situation.
The participants made comments that indicated an awareness of issues relating to the
impact that allegations of CSA have on the child as well as the family. Judge Bruth said
it‟s always better, I think, if you could, to try and keep the child in as normal a setting as
possible, because they‟ve been traumatized enough as it is, without sending them off
somewhere where they don‟t know anybody.
Judge Reeves said “you know, it‟s a trauma on the mother.” Judge Bush recognized that “we are
asking in particular about the most difficult experience this child has ever had.” Judge Fom
commented that “any exposure to that (CSA) has a certain degree of harm,” here referring to
situations that included times when the allegation might have been planted in the child‟s head.
The assessment of the level of the impact of the traumatic allegation on the relationship
between the mother and the alleged perpetrator was of interest to the two Youth Court judges.
Judge Bruth said
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because you‟ve got these situations - like the mother of the child and the male perpetrator
still have such a close relationship - that you can‟t trust the mother, you know, with
information as much as you‟d like to. Then you have other situations where they
completely cut the tie...
Judge Reeves took a more proactive stance.
I want to know the mother‟s mental health with regards to whether she believes the child
and supports her own child or whether she‟s sticking with the guy, and I have had a many
a one in my courtroom say “I‟m sticking with the guy.”
The participants all put forth protecting the child as the focus. Toward this end, the
comments indicated a judicial need for MHPs to be able to assess the level of influence the
family has on the allegation. This was evident in the comments made indicating that MHPs need
to be aware of potential ulterior motives the parents may have. Judge Bush said “I need
somebody to join me that is on the side of the child and help me give some light into what is
going on in that child‟s head.” Judge Reed had an ongoing emphasis on being aware that in
court cases either party might have motives for their behavior outside of MHP awareness, and
that these should be included in our assessment. For this reason, throughout this interview there
were such comments as “talk to everybody”, and “talk to more than just the mother and the
child.”
Again the two Youth Court judges‟ comments were somewhat different. While their
comments indicate an awareness of the possibility of ulterior motives, their focus is on the child
to such an extent that the ulterior motives of others did not seem to have as much impact. Judge
Reeves reported that “In Youth Court, it‟s a different animal,” adding, “we‟re in the courtroom
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and that‟s a confidential proceeding. So we just - it all gets out on the table. It all gets out on the
table.”
The participant‟s awareness of following the „best interests of the child‟ standard was
present in each theme. In the family theme, the comments were related to the need for MHPs to
participate to minimize the trauma, and put the child in as nearly a whole position as possible.
Judge Bush said “you as a clinician are treating that child because you want to help them
overcome whatever they have been through” and “if there is a misunderstanding or something,
and there appears to be good faith on both parents, a MHP can go a long way towards mending
the damage.” Judge Bruth‟s initial comment was that MHPs should be involved from beginning
to end.
First of all to identify the children who are abused, or work with the DHS, Department of
Human Services, to identify those who are abused, and in some cases for example with
the children advocacy type situations, to help prove the abuse, and then after that‟s all
been done, of course, to give them counsel; care; to set up some sort of a treatment plan
to try to help them overcome the results of the sexual abuse.
Credibility
The credibility theme represents comments that reflect the judicial need for MHPs to be
trustworthy and believable. The participants indicated that from their perspective, possibly the
most significant role for a MHP was to maintain credibility with “the mom, the dad, and the
court.” Judge Fom noted that this would be a “very difficult” task. The subthemes that
developed within this theme include knowing the system, willingness to participate openly and
candidly, and helping the child. I felt that the effectiveness of the interview questions was
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apparent here, in that most of the comments were coded into this theme, although I am aware
that this might also be due to researcher bias.
In the subtheme of knowing the system, the comments reflected that the participants felt
that MHPs should understand how the system works in order to effectively participate. The
comments are further divided into comments regarding the need for MHPs to be aware of their
role, specifically fact v. expert witness, the participant suggestion of how MHPs should or should
not handle court involvement, and comments regarding the judicial perception of MHPs who are
also child advocates outside the courtroom.
Judge Bruth had the best overall statement to reflect the need for MHPs to understand the
system. “I think they have to have an understanding of what the rules are, especially in dealing
with the court, and things like that, you know, have to comply with their ethical standards.”
Judge Reed succinctly stated that “in court, your job is to testify as to - either you are an expert
witness or you are a fact witness. To me, that‟s it.” Judge Fom said “I am not sure it is clear on
the ground between the person called in as to whether they are going to be a fact witness or
whether they are going to be an expert.” Continuing,
I think if you are called as an expert then you gotta be the expert. If you are called as a
fact witness, you can‟t be the expert, and you can‟t give - now, you know, the rules allow
an opinion- but frankly, when you are an expert in that field I think that opinion should be
excluded by the court unless you are qualified as an expert and there to give an expert
opinion.
Judge Fom further described a situation in which a particular MHP had navigated this mine field
effectively. The situation involved a request from a MHP who was testifying in a custody
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hearing. The MHP had requested that the judge allow her to testify outside the hearing of the
child, so that the therapeutic relationship might be protected.
She wasn‟t put forth as an expert, and therefore she wasn‟t qualified as an expert by the
lawyers. So she was a fact based witness, but she was very careful. I was very impressed
with her professionalism. That she knew the difference in just being a friend of that
student or a mentor of the student, or whatever it might be, like a teacher, and her role as
a counselor.
Judge Reed offered another scenario to help clarify the role.
It depends on what you are called for. If you are called just to give a diagnosis, then,
that‟s your function, that‟s it. If you are called to give an expert opinion on whether or
not, in your opinion, that the child has been sexually abused, you are again giving me an
expert opinion, and that‟s based on your expertise - what you do for a living, how many
cases like this you‟ve handled. Stuff like that, that‟s what I want…you are being called
to give an expert opinion, whether THIS CHILD, in your opinion, based on your
experience, and your readings has been the victim of sexual; mental; whatever kind of
abuse, and that‟s based on your treatment of the child, or your review of the records,
sometimes, and stuff like that.
Judge Bush said
we are looking for an MHP to be very credible in telling us what their opinion is - in what
we can do to protect this child. You aren‟t being an advocate; you are being an expert to
report what you‟ve found.
Other comments reflected how MHP knowledge of the system helps the court. Judge
Reeves said, when referring to testimony regarding specific techniques used,
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that tends to be the problem of the person testifying. They don‟t tend to get it out there,
you know? If they could medically explain what a picture of daddy sitting here with the
little girl means. But they want to get to the conclusion without explaining their medical
basis for getting there. They tend to say „Oh, see? She drew a picture of a man and a
little girl? That‟s - obviously she‟s been sexually abused.‟ Well, I can‟t make that
quantum leap in evidence. So, it‟s not that they don‟t know what they are doing; it‟s just
that they don‟t present it in a fashion that gives me something to hang my hat on.
Judge Reeves also had the following suggestion regarding MHP interviews of children. “It has
to be under certain conditions that verify or give trustworthiness to the child‟s statements. It
can‟t be coached testimony and they can‟t have an axe to grind.” Judge Reed commented on the
impact of possible MHP bias. “They have not talked to the other side - it looks biased when you
are cross examined.” Judge Reed went on to offer an example of a cross examination:
“Did you talk to my client?”
“No.”
“Did you call my client?”
“No.”
“What? You just relied on everything he or she said?”
“Yes.”
Then commenting: “You know that‟s a problem. It‟s a red herring to you.”
Judge Reed made the following suggestion to minimize bias.
Once you find out there is a court proceeding, and both sides have a lawyer, I don‟t know
why you can‟t contact your client‟s lawyer and say „I‟ve been treating her, and I
understand that y‟all are gonna call me to give an expert opinion on something. I would
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like to know - I would like to interview the other side. Could you arrange that through
his lawyer?‟ and if he says no, then, you know, at least you‟ve made an effort. You can
at least say I attempted to do that. That‟s an option that sometimes MHPs should take,
can I at least see if I can talk to the other side a bit.
Judge Fom‟s comments here were uncharacteristically closer in kind to Judges Reeves and Reed.
In discussing the use of MHPs for procedural gain in a court hearing, Judge Fom said
I think that is unfortunate. That abuses the MHP. But I think the MHP has to be alert to
that, and to understand that they need to, if possible, to see; to interview both; to get all
the information from both sides to make a valid judgment about what is in the child‟s best
interest. So, I think the MHP would have to be very careful about taking at face value
what one parent is saying.
Judge Fom also said
again, that‟s difficult, because this person has approached you. This person is your client.
This person is paying you to make a decision that‟s based on all the facts that may be not
as zealous as that person wants, or may be lukewarm. In fact, in some cases I can‟t give
an opinion that this person should get custody. I mean, that‟s possible too, but I think
that‟s the responsibility of that person (MHP).
Judge Bruth‟s comments reflected awareness that knowing the system was influenced by the
geographical location. “It depends on what the resources are that are available to you. In some
cases you might have to refer out for treatment; you might end up eventually in an institutional
setting away from this area.” And later,
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I think that‟s one of the places where sometimes the rural setting is more of a handicap
because of having fewer people to be able to assume those roles. We tend to want to fill
the void and sometimes that‟s not possible because you end up with conflicts.
One area of particular interest to me, involved the judicial perception of MHPs who could
also be considered child advocates. While it is expected that the opposing attorney will ardently
challenge the objectivity of the MHP testifying, sometimes that challenge is based on that MHPs
reputation as a person who advocates against child abuse. The comments indicate that the judges
did not feel that MHP credibility was necessarily impacted by also being a child advocate, but
that the MHP had to be careful to maintain credibility “throughout.” The perception also
evidences an awareness of the important role that MHPs can play in helping to combat the abuse
of children in a broader more systemic way. Judge Fom highlighted the two extremes clearly.
That‟s a field they‟ve chosen. They are very passionate about it. I think that (public
advocacy) could be an attribute, in a lot of cases. You just have to look at it case by case.
Now, if it turned out to be a bizarre thing where they were out there on the edge, and I
thought they had gone across lines, yeah, it could possibly not give them the credibility
they would otherwise deserve, if I thought they were way out there. In some cases, it may
be good that they thought seriously enough about their profession and what they were
seeing to advocate publicly.
Judge Bush was on the same page.
I really don‟t have a problem with people speaking publicly about it. I think it‟s
important that MHPs who understand the problem can express to our legislature the
importance of making laws that protect children. I am not saying that a MHP can‟t be an
advocate. I am saying that in that courtroom your role is not an advocate.
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Judge Bruth had a metaphor to share.
I don‟t think you can find anybody who would advocate that abusing children were
appropriate, so it‟s kinda like taking a very benign position. So if I am against people
going out drunk driving and killing people on the highway, that doesn‟t mean I couldn‟t
judge somebody who came in and did that. Because it‟s just natural that you can have
normal opinions. I think in many cases, for example in a legal context, also in a mental
health context, it is an appropriate function of a MHP to advocate the appropriate
positions; for example, that we should establish agencies, or programs to help kids that
have problems. And just because you want that doesn‟t mean that you could not
necessarily be objective.
Judge Reed very succinctly stated in response to whether MHP credibility was affected by
public advocacy,
No it does not. It doesn‟t affect me at all. I think that‟s part of your job, to talk about a
child‟s rights, I guess. For most people, you get in a relationship with a child, you‟re
gonna go in and advocate for that child. I don‟t have a problem with that.
Judge Reeves was the only participant who took the opposite view. The response was just as
succinctly in the other direction. “Yes. Yes. They get all wrapped up in it; emotional in it.” A
description followed of a particular organization that was always biased in favor of the child.
The second subtheme of the theme of maintaining credibility is willingness to be open
and candid. This subtheme is defined as comments that reflect the judicial need to be privy to
the information that MHPs have, and descriptions of appropriate MHP behaviors to meet that
goal. There was a general impression that judges need to be able to rely on MHPs. An image of
a complex relationship took shape, with the judges recognizing the importance of our
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participation even though they accepted the possible dangers in relying too completely on a
potentially biased MHP. At the same time, the comments showed recognition that MHPs often
feel conflicted about being openly candid in court.
Judge Bush was the most reflective of this. “I think that the court must rely heavily on
mental health experts in determining the sexual abuse of children.” In discussing the need for
MHPs to be willing,
we have to have MHPs who will not run from it, but will embrace it so that we can
protect that child. I can‟t control their mom and their dad, but I can try to get that child to
somebody who can weed things out. I think it is imperative that we have folks that will
embrace it. You simply have to have reliable people who are willing to embrace it and to
see that they are not being used as a pawn in court, just to be pulled and tugged.
Judge Bush also said
I am gonna rely heavily - these are such difficult decisions, and you want as much expert
testimony as you can. And so it is imperative that we have good MHPs that… help the
court, and make those decisions.
Judge Fom said “you‟ve got to give the court adequate facts that the court needs to make a valid
decision. It is too important not to,” and “I feel like that in Mississippi particularly, Chancellors
need the information in order to make a valid decision.” Judge Reed: “…your role would be of
course, to, I think, to advise the court of your findings…” Judge Reeves was more descriptive.
A mental health person that comes into the courtroom, I expect a direct answer…I mean
at some point, if you‟ve got a child that says „I‟ve been sexually abused‟, and the adult
denies it, and the child says it happened, you‟ve got no evidence to back up either side.
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Then I‟ve got to have a MHP that is willing to come into court and say within reasonable
medical certainty, „I believe the child‟ or „I don‟t believe the child.‟
And later he added
If they believe a child has been molested, they need to open their mouth and say the
child‟s been molested, and that‟s their opinion, and stick by it. Because that is what the
judge is going to base it on.
The participants also made comments to indicate how they thought MHPs should, and
should not, handle involvement in cases of CSA. Judge Reeves said “I get very aggravated when
one of them will get in here and won‟t give me an opinion. That‟s exactly what they are
supposed to be doing is giving me their opinion.” Judge Reeves also realized, however, that in
some situations that might not be possible.
There are certainly times where a professional could get in there and say „Judge, I don‟t
know,‟ you see? I mean, „You got four factors that say he did it, then you‟ve got four or
five that say I don‟t know if he did it.‟
Judge Reed made a similar comment, from the other perspective of a case being so clear there
was no need to interview the other side.
You know, there are probably some cases that you don‟t need to - where the facts are so
clear to you - „I don‟t care what he says.‟ That‟s what you would tell the court. „It
wouldn‟t make any difference, Judge, I didn‟t need to talk to the other side, because a, b,
c, and it‟s that clear, it‟s that clear to me.‟ That‟s fine too, you know.
Judge Reeves suggested that a MHP
Get to the point. Give me a justifiable medical reason. All you gotta do is say „Well, the
study from Yale University where fifteen hundred children were examined, and so and

96

so, and the probability is so great that that picture indicates this,‟ in other words, they‟ve
backed it up with something other than just saying - just skipping to the end.
Judge Reed continued to point out the need to interview both sides.
My only problem is when they are called in to give an expert opinion on child custody,
for any reason, you know, whatever reasons they give for calling them in, and the MHP
has not talked to ALL the parties…what I like is for the counselor to have interviewed
not only the mother and the child, but the person who is the alleged perpetrator.
Judge Bruth cautioned objectivity. “If it didn‟t happen, they need to be very careful not to let
their personal feelings intervene with their ability to be objective as to what actually happened.”
Judge Bush said
I trust that people in the MHP area are trained to do things in such a way that an answer is
not planted in a child‟s mind. That we use different methods that they (children) are
more open to discussing things with…so I certainly would respect that opinion of that
MHP, that uses whatever means to encourage the child to relax; and to trust; and to
encourage that child to be open with whatever is on their mind.
Judge Fom stated that
If I just had a MHP come in and give me the standard script one liners, without the use of
any techniques, or as I said, tools, I might be suspect that they were as effective an
advocate for the child, or as knowledgeable, thorough, or professional as they needed to
be.
The final subtheme of the maintaining credibility theme is comments that reflected a need
to keep the child in the forefront. This general idea was present in all the themes. Judge Fom in
discussing “hired guns”, who presumably do not have the best interests of the child at heart, said
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“Integrity and professionalism needs to be placed in a place of more importance than just who is
paying the tab, or what they want you to find.” Judge Bush was the most passionate about this
issue. “Number one, they (MHPs) can be the voice for the child…a child that has already been
victimized and victimized does not need to go through the trauma.” Judge Bush went further,
stating
I would say that MHP has got to be, in each case „I am here to help the child, but how do
I help the child? If the perpetrator is the parent, then obviously, I deal with the other
parent, and deal with the court in protecting that child,‟ but it is a case by case basis.
Parents need to be informed. If they are not part of the problem, then they are part of the
solution. It‟s the MHP that needs to work with those parents…I said it was venomous, so
it‟s important for MHPs who know what they are doing, and a court who has seen lots of
different things, to reign everybody back in sometimes.
When discussing how to look out for the best interests of the child, Judge Bush added
I need you to do some things to loosen that child up…because it strengthens the
credibility of the story, where you are simply meeting that child where they are in life, as
opposed to simply running in there and reporting to you.
Judge Bush also said “Certainly if you think a child has been abused, and the court is not
responding, you ought to turn into an advocate. Somebody ought to be shaking folks and telling
them „Let‟s protect this child.‟” Judge Reed stated that in order to protect children‟s rights,
MHPs should just, “follow the law,” by “if you are counseling a child and you come up with a
belief that some child is being molested, you have an obligation under the statute to report that,
and that‟s how you protect the child‟s rights, to me.”
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Experiential Perspective
The experiential perspective is significant because these are the comments that the
participants made in direct relation to specific judicial experiences regarding CSA. The most
predominant similarity in this theme was that four of the five participants mentioned a specific
MHP. Usually these comments were positive. “She does a good job”, or “she was smart to think
of that” or “she is always a good witness”. Negative comments tended to be around the concept
of “hired gun” and bias that led to always believing the child in spite of the evidence. There was
also a general notion that MHPs should possibly be appointed by the court. Four of the five
participants referred to this directly. Judge Fom discussed this concept through discussion of the
Guardian ad Litem (GAL), and Judge Bruth‟s interview suggested that in that jurisdiction the
involvement of MHPs was understood to be court appointed.
Most of the comments made in relation to the question regarding the judicial awareness
of Play Therapy as a modality for treating children were coded in either this theme or the
operational theme. The reason for this was that most of the comments regarding Play Therapy
were based on each participant‟s experience of Play Therapy in the courtroom.
The participant experience of MHPs in CSA, overall, was positive. It is interesting to
note that their personal experiences with MHPs in the courtroom did impact their perception of
MHPs, again, along a continuum from Judge Fom on one end to Judge Reeves on the other. I
had originally thought that possibly the judges with the most experience with MHPs might be the
most open to MHPs, but the comments were not in keeping with this idea. It appears that in
reality, the judges with the most experience with MHPs in the courtroom were the most
skeptical.
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Judge Reeves was the most emphatic regarding potential MHP bias, followed by Judge
Reed. Judge Bruth was the only participant who did not mention a specific MHP in a specific
instance, but there was reference to specific types of organizations that participated in CSA, and
Judge Bruth was the most aware of the importance of having different MHPs to fill different
roles. Judge Bush was the most open to both positive and negative aspects of MHPs, mentioning
a particular MHP whose credibility had been seriously brought into question. Judge Fom
described an experience in which he had interacted with an MHP who had discussed with him
the complications that might arise from her testimony in relation to her clinical relationship with
the child in question.
While each participant in one way or another indicated some awareness of the
complications and complexities that MHPs might face when testifying in cases of CSA, the
overall attitude was one of focusing on the issue at hand. The participants were most interested
in being able to rely on MHP testimony. They wanted to be able to know that MHPs were not
biased. The participant comments indicate that MHPs testifying in court should remember that,
as Judge Bush put it, “it is imperative that they (MHPs) realize that the court is not using that
person for anything but to help that child.”
Toward this end, there was a great emphasis on being certain that the MHP was not a
“hired gun”. Judge Bush stated that
I was trained to be a lawyer. I was not trained to interview a child on whether or not - on
a forensic interview. I want someone who is well qualified…there have been some folks
in the past, (name removed), we used to rely heavily on…it turned out the work was not
good; and so it is imperative that we have people who are willing to do this.
Judge Fom said
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when I was practicing it always seemed like there was always somebody that was a quote
„hired gun‟ and it didn‟t matter what the evidence showed, that person ALWAYS found
for the person that was paying. And it was easy for me, on cross examination, to
discredit them.
The experiential aspect of this came out in relation to the two most experienced judges more
directly.
Judge Reeves said “the biggest falling out we‟ve had up here has been, in the twenty
something years I‟ve been up here, are those ladies out of the (name removed).” He went on to
state that “they are terribly biased in favor of the child. It does not lend to fairness in the
courtroom to actually get to the bottom of it.” Judge Reed said
My only problem I have in cases is that I don‟t like hired guns in a sense, where one party
is paying you…but you don‟t interview anybody but one side. That‟s my problem,
because you get a distorted view.
Judge Bush urged caution.
You have to be careful because when you cross lines - sometimes even though your
motives may be pure - it sometimes looks like that you‟re overly zealous or something
like that, so your credibility could be damaged. I have seen that happen on occasion.
The participants also made many comments based on their experience that indicated what
they did want. Judge Fom: “I want the facts.” Judge Fom felt that anyone who needed to share
information with the court should feel free to do so, because if they did not, then that would
“throw a road block into what I need to know.” Also stating that “from my stand point as a
judge, I want to know that adequate investigation has been done about not only what‟s going on,
but the effect on the child.” Judge Bush emphasized throughout that there was a need for MHPs
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to be willing to participate fully. “We have to have MHPs who will not run from it, but will
embrace it so that we can protect the child.” Judge Bruth said “they need to be very careful not
to let their personal feelings intervene with their ability to be objective as to what actually
happened.” Judge Reed said “sometimes I appoint the mental health examiner, because that way
the person is perceived not to have a bias.”
Judges Reed and Reeves were the most specific. In describing a particular MHP Judge
Reed perceived as effective,
she‟s a very good witness, no matter who calls her, because she would have already - she
might not have talked to the defendant - but she would have talked to teachers and other
people beside just the mother and the child. She would go a little further.
and “that‟s why I like to appoint.” Judge Reeves mentioned several effective MHPs, all who
were able to “get to the point.” Judge Reeves wanted “the child interviewed in a setting that
leads to truthfulness without coaching and come to a very, very concise opinion on what has
happened, and the believability of the child.” The judge made reference to a specific
organization “that needs to be the first people to interview a small child that makes an allegation.
They do it in such a context that there is no coaching and they make a determination based on
those interviews.” Judge Reeves‟ feeling was so strong that “it ought to be a law in this state”
that this organization be the first to interview.
Operational
The operational theme is very close to the experiential perspective theme. It was coded
separately because the participant comments in the operational theme are more specific to the
courtroom environment in general as opposed to any particular participant experience. This
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theme is rich in information to aid the MHP in developing their battle plan for involvement in
cases of CSA.
This theme includes comments that reflect the judicial description of the system‟s
concrete approach to CSA. The participants indicate that MHPs have no role in this area. The
comments indicate that judges perceive this to be their role exclusively, and the comments
indicate that judges resent anything that interferes with their being able to determine what is in
the best interest of the child. Therefore, if the perception is that a MHP is working against the
judge‟s determination of the child‟s best interest, the MHP credibility would be lost.
The participants indicate that they want independent testimony that can help them
initially determine the accuracy of the allegation. After this, the court wants to use whatever
means at its discretion to help the child. The participants indicated that the inclusion of a
Guardian ad Litem (GAL) helped with this, as the GAL was an unbiased arm of the court. The
participants also seemed to place the parent‟s interest as secondary to the interest of the child,
and to recognize the need for mental health evidence to be “accepted in the field” before it could
be admitted into evidence in court.
Judge Reeves said
The court system has to know if the child is telling the truth and the event happened.
And that‟s what we‟re there for. Then after that we have got a lot of alternatives. But
first you gotta cross that threshold, did it happen?
and further,
When you‟re looking at a case of sexual abuse the burden of proof is by preponderance of
the evidence. I have to believe one side‟s testimony is more credible just by a hair than
the other side. It‟s not like the criminal standard beyond a reasonable doubt, which is a
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very strong burden. All I‟ve gotta do is believe one side or the other. Whichever tips that
little scale, just a little is the side that wins.
Judge Reed said
There are certain things in the law that I can do. But there are certain things I can‟t do. If
the party does not prove certain allegations, there is very little I can do. Because the
burden of proof in the law is what it is. You know, so, for a mother who alleges that the
father has sexually abused the daughter or the son, and there is no proof, there is very
little I can do - you have to meet the burden of proof to prove your case - if you failed to
prove your child was in danger, then I can‟t assume it is true, even though in my gut I say
”oh yeah,: but I can‟t. I have to follow the law.
Judge Bruth said “did it happen or did it not happen. Somebody who did something wrong
should be punished. Somebody who didn‟t should be helped.” Continuing, “the ultimate
question in many cases is not whether abusing children is good or bad, because I think that‟s
pretty much decided, it‟s did this person do this, or was this child abuse.” Judge Bush said
“…that we are dealing with the facts and circumstances. That we are there together.” Judge
Fom said “we are here trying to seek the truth. So you know everything that might have a
bearing on what the truth is, I think is important.”
The participant comments that indicated a judicial resentment of anything perceived to be
interfering with their responsibilities in relation to the children involved in CSA followed the
continuum from Judge Reeves and Reed on one end, to Judge Fom on the other. Judges Reeves
and Reed had the most notable reactions to perceived interference, and Judge Fom and Judge
Bush the least. Judge Reed said “I happen to think that it‟s the judge‟s job to protect the child‟s
rights,” and “It‟s the court‟s job to protect the child,” and “if there is a right that is violated, then
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my job is to protect the child…I‟m not sure what right they (children) have that needs to be
protected by a MHP, to me.” Judge Bruth said “I don‟t feel appropriate or competent to deal
with most of the mental health issues, and I don‟t feel most MHPs would be appropriate to deal
with my legal issues.” Judge Fom said
You can make the distinction, I guess, that the counselor is not an attorney, and therefore
is not bound by attorney/client - so the question in my mind would be, do they have a
duty to protect legal rights - again, that‟s kind of a blurred line.
Judge Bruth recognized the potential conflict that MHPs might have, stating
We (judges) have to realize that you can have conflict of interest just as much as in the
legal area. You can have conflict of interest in the mental health area, and sometimes the
best advice to give to a perpetrator is far different than the best advice you can give to the
mother who is not a perpetrator or to a victim, or even to the court.
When discussing the appointment of a GAL it becomes evident that the participants all
relied on these court appointed professionals in cases of CSA. Judge Fom said “if there is any
suggestion of abuse, the law requires that you appoint a GAL. And what I‟ve done is appoint a
GAL and ask them to conduct an investigation.” Judge Fom described a GAL as “The question
for GAL was whether or not they were the attorney for the child, or whether they were the
investigator, or an arm of the court, to quote that phrase.” Judge Bush was emphatic about the
appointment of a GAL
Anytime there are allegations of abuse or neglect the GAL - the law says a GAL SHALL
be appointed. It is not optional; it is their (GAL) obligation to protect the rights of the
child, and I think a MHP should see that GAL for what they are - strictly there to try and
make sure the truth is told and that the child is protected.
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Judge Reeves succinctly stated “the child‟s rights are being protected by a GAL. The GAL has a
lawyer, because the GAL is a layperson, so I‟ve appointed a lawyer for the GAL.”
Throughout the data indicates that the participants always had “the child, the child, the
child” at the forefront. When confronted with the possibility that sometimes the children‟s rights
and the parent‟s rights might be in conflict, the comments made it clear that the participants
would always come down on the side of the child. Judge Reeves said “if we find the child is
manipulative and lying and all that, I‟m still concentrating on the child. I want the child to go to
mental health,” and “I‟m not worried about the parents.” Judge Bruth said “my obligation - the
court‟s obligation is to…make sure that those children are properly protected - their rights are to
be protected, and it just depends on how you have to do that,” and further, “I can only do that
with taking into account the child‟s best interests and protection. If they (parents) can‟t protect
the child, they‟re not gonna have the child.” Judge Bush: “I would certainly draw on some of the
case law that talks about the court being a super guardian, and that ultimately we are to protect
that child.” When directly addressing balancing the child‟s rights against the parent‟s rights, the
judge indicated that the parent‟s rights would be secondary, saying “I think that we oftentimes
make exception to that if it‟s not in the child‟s best interests.” Judge Fom said
I think the child‟s rights, just like the adult‟s, need to be protected - but I think it probably
goes beyond that because the child doesn‟t have an advocate in the courtroom unless the
child has a GAL - so I think the court has to look out for the rights of the child.
The participant interviews also indicated an awareness of the significance of MHP
testimony that is accepted in the mental health field, in keeping with information gathered in the
literature review. Judge Reed said
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If Play Therapy has been documented or accepted in your profession as adequate, reliable
therapy, and that‟s what they present to me, then I am probably gonna let it in, because it
has been accepted in the field. If it is accepted in the field of therapy, then I‟m gonna
give it the weight it‟s (sic) supposed to give.
Judge Bruth said “…that would be my only hesitation, is to make sure that whatever the
technique - if the interview or therapy was not planting ideas - as far as facts - but simply trying
to develop them.” Judge Fom said “…if this is a tried and true technique, the lack of that might
somehow effect whether or not I think they have done everything they should,” and “I would
think if it‟s an approved method, or it is a taught method, or it‟s a tried and true method,
certainly, anything, any tools in the toolbox ought to be used.”
Summary
The overall impression of the data indicates that the judicial perception of the role of
MHPs in cases of CSA is complex. It is significant that the participants did all have the best
interests of the child in mind throughout the interviews. The data is in keeping with the
information gained from the literature review, and each participant interview gave the same basic
information.
If I were to sum up the answers to my interview questions based on the participant
answers, I would say that the judicial perspective of the role that MHPs should play in cases of
CSA is that of investigator. The participants might recognize the potential conflict that MHPs
can face in balancing the roles of clinician vs. witness, but feel that any balancing should favor
the child first, and informing the court second.
The participants were in complete keeping with the literature review on the issue of
child‟s rights, as they all pondered this question, with one participant stating “I don‟t know that I
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have seen anything that says what a child‟s rights in a sexual abuse case is.” The participants
were all more able to list some parental rights, and it was only in the discussion of parental rights
that the potential conflict with the child‟s rights began to become apparent.
The judges did not have much of an issue with the credibility of a MHP who could also
be considered to be a child advocate, although they acknowledged that this might become an
issue in some instances. Here again, the overall focus was what was going to be most helpful in
determining what was in the best interest of the child. It would seem necessary for MHPs to
protect their reputation vigorously, however.
The questions regarding Play Therapy were in keeping with the cases discussed in the
literature review regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence. Overall the participants
discussed that this was fully in the role of the MHP, with several pointing out that they did not
have mental health expertise. Therefore, the judges reported that they rely on MHPs to help
them determine what is or is not appropriate to be introduced as therapeutic evidence. The
significance of these issues is discussed more fully in Chapter five.
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Chapter Five
DISCUSSION
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to gain a deeper understanding of how judges
perceive Mental Health Professionals (MHPs) involved in cases of child sexual abuse (CSA).
The research focused on addressing the complexities that exist for MHPs in cases of CSA.
These include balancing the roles that MHPs may have to play in CSA cases, the uncertainty
around the definition of the child‟s rights, how the child‟s rights have to be balanced against the
parent‟s rights, and how judges perceive MHP credibility. MHPs with CSA experience were
asked to suggest judges before whom they had testified. Five judges in Mississippi were selected
as participants, and each was interviewed face to face. There were three Chancery Judges, and
two County/Youth Court Judges. The number of participants was small, but in keeping with a
qualitative approach (Patton, 2002). The data was analyzed into themes. Chapter five will
discuss how the data related to the literature review, and implications for policy, research, and
practice.
Overview
This project began as the inkling of an idea in the back of my mind at a time when I
found myself in the middle of a situation for which there seemed to be no solution. All of my
training and knowledge told me what actions to take, but none of those actions were effective. I
wanted to learn from the situation, and be able to develop a plan for how to act in cases of CSA
such that the untenable situation that my clients were in could be avoided. The more I looked for
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such an answer, however, the harder it was to find. No one, it seemed, had any more clarity than
I did.
A qualitative approach to psychosocial research seems invaluable. There is so much
about human nature and human behavior and the interaction of the two that cannot be quantified,
try though we might. This phenomenon is squarely in that category. There are many scholars
who have researched and studied CSA from many different angles. There are also legal scholars
who have dissected and discussed the best ways to present CSA cases. Still, however, there
remained an unidentified elephant in the room. I felt, as a practitioner, that the legal system was
on one side of the room, the MHPs on the other with this elephantine divide in between. Even
when this idea was just an inkling, I felt that if I could tackle that elephant; understand that
elephant, I would be a more effective advocate for my clients who are victims of CSA. It was
not always clear, however, what that elephant represented.
Eventually, though, it became clear that the one player on the battleground of CSA that
remained somewhat of an unknown was the judge. In much the same way that silence and
secrecy allows the abuse of children to continue, this unknown quantity of the judge seemed to
be a hindrance to the effective development of a battle plan to advocate for the protection of a
child victim of CSA. The silence and secrecy that is such a part of child abuse also creates, in
my opinion, a duality that calls for qualitative research. Quantitative research might have led to
data that confirmed already available information, but still would have left questions about the
profundity of the judicial perceptions. It is that deeper, richer information that was unknown.
The face to face discussion of these issues with judges who have had the experience of presiding
over cases of CSA is the only way to put this into context; the only way to identify the elephant.
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The study of the judicial perception of MHPs is a phenomenological study. The overall
research question focused on how judges perceive MHPs in cases of CSA, with the purpose of
clarifying this issue for MHPs. The transcripts indicated that there were four major themes, with
six subthemes.
The participant demographics included three Caucasian men, one Caucasian woman, and
one African American woman. Geographically, the participants ranged from North Mississippi
to the Pine Hills in Southern Mississippi, with points in between. The experience of the judges
was also varied. In years, their experience ranged from newly elected to seventeen years. The
participants also had differing experiences prior to their years on the bench. All had practiced
law, but some had been primarily in private practice, while others had been prosecuting
attorneys. One had been a mediator, and one had worked extensively in the family law area as a
practitioner. The amount of experience each participant had with CSA led to richer data, with
more descriptions of preferred MHP behavior.
The overall impression from all the participant interviews was similar. The only factor
that impacted the participant comments was the effect of the amount of experience the
participants had with CSA. Michrina and Richards (1996) describe this as “a transformation that
takes place over a length of time" (p. 87), which I have referred to, for the purposes of this study,
as a CSA process effect. The significance of this lies in the awareness that working with CSA
can lead to an alteration in perception. This seemingly intuitive fact may be worthy of future
research, as the apparent CSA process effect does not appear to lead where one might expect.
Discussion of the Themes
The first theme, the family, had three subthemes, the influence of the family over the
child, issues unique to involving children in the judicial process, and resulting trauma on the
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child and the family from an allegation of CSA. The second theme is credibility, and it also has
three subthemes which are: knowing the system, willingness to participate openly and candidly,
and helping the child. Neither the third theme, experiential perspective, nor the fourth theme,
operational, developed any subthemes.
The Family
The family theme is significant to the overall judicial perception of MHPs. The data
indicated that judges were aware of the intricate complexities that CSA cases can create within a
family. It also indicated that the judges need MHPs to be open and honest with them in order to
make a valid decision regarding what is best for the child. As a MHP, this helps me because I
feel more confident of my position on the CSA battleground, and also less hesitant to notify a
judge directly if I feel that the system is somehow failing to respond.
The family theme is also in keeping with the literature review, especially the article
regarding Dr. Smith and his forensic evaluation (Kuehnle, 1998). The purpose of that article was
to highlight an ineffective forensic evaluation of a child in a case of CSA. The participants in
this study all made comments in keeping with that article. Each participant in one way or
another referred to bias on the part of MHPs. They all wanted to be able to rely on the fact that
the MHP was objective, and not taking one side over the other, but accurately assessing the
situation. The data also indicated that MHPs need to be aware of the possibility of ulterior
motives on the part of the family, which was not specifically mentioned in the literature.
Arguably, ulterior motives become clear if an assessment is appropriately done. It bears noting,
however, that the experience of the participants in this study drove them to want to mention the
need for MHPs to be aware of possible manipulation from parents specifically.
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The subthemes are all equal, none having more significance than the other. The
subtheme of influence of the family over the child is indicative of the judicial awareness of the
need for MHPs to assess the truthfulness of the allegation. The literature review indicated much
awareness of the possible mine fields here, such as suggestibility of interviews (Myklebust &
Bjorklund, 2009; Rosenthal, 2002; Schreiber, 2000) and again, bias of MHPs (Kuehnle, 1998).
The interview data was also in keeping here. The judges each mentioned suggestibility, and the
effect of MHP bias was present throughout the interviews. The data added to this area, in that
the participants with County/Youth Court experience had an interest in the possibly triangular
relationship between the mother, the alleged victim and the alleged perpetrator, which was
deeper than those mentioned by the judges without County/Youth Court experience, and an
aspect of the phenomenon that did not show up in this literature review.
The subtheme of issues unique to involving children in the judicial process could have
come directly from the literature review. The questions were not designed to elicit this
information, but, the answers included issues that were also discussed in the literature regarding
difficulties around the testimony of children (Connolly et al., 2009; MRE 803(25)). The judicial
comments indicated an awareness of the trauma that testifying could cause a child, the awareness
that children are not developmentally able to communicate effectively, as well as the issue of
whether or not young children can appreciate the importance of telling the truth.
The last subtheme, resulting trauma on the child, indicates the judicial awareness of the
severity of their responsibility. The judge‟s recognition of the child‟s suffering did give them
pause. This is possibly another implication of the CSA process effect. One might expect the
impact of continued exposure to this type of violence against children to have led to a different
effect, in that the more exposure a judge had to the sexual abuse of children, the more inured to
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its horror he or she might have become. The transferability of this study to this issue is not as
strong as I might like, but still there is some indication in this data that the opposite is true, and
the more experience the judges have with CSA, the more determined they become to protect
child victims of CSA. At the same time, the judges with the most experience are also more
aware of the significance of an accurate assessment. This is very hopeful. The assessment of
CSA is a serious task. It should not be taken lightly, and knowing that judges rely on these
assessments makes me more determined to perform them effectively. It also helps me feel more
likely to approach the judge, especially in a County/Youth Court setting, as I no longer see the
judge as some sort of adversarial elephant.
Credibility
The credibility theme is the meat of the analysis. This is the theme that most directly
describes how judges perceive MHPs in cases of CSA, both in what they have seen, what they
like from MHPs and what they don‟t like. The subthemes that developed in this theme are
knowing the system, willingness to participate openly and candidly, and helping the child. The
literature review sections on clinician roles and system expectations lend much credibility to the
data in this theme.
In knowing the system, the participant answers indicated that they believed that in order
to effectively participate in a case of CSA, the MHPs need to be aware of how the system works
and who the players are. Guardians ad Litem (GALs) were a frequent mention here. GALs did
appear in the literature, but not as prominently as they did in the data, which may be a reflection
of limiting the participants to the State of Mississippi, where the appointment of a GAL is
mandatory in cases of child abuse. The literature referred to the need for MHPs to be competent
in their involvement in court (Kuehnle, 1998), and the importance of the MHP being fully aware
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of the particular role they were to play in each case (Schreiber, 2000). The participants each
made reference to fact versus expert witness, using much the same language as found in the
articles. This study adds to the knowledge in that the legal system does not seem to be as aware
of the difference between a therapeutic assessment and a forensic evaluation as they probably
need to be in order to effectively judge the reliability of MHP assessments.
The subtheme of willingness to participate openly and candidly was unexpected. I knew
that MHPs were often hesitant to participate in court cases, but as I‟ve described, I attributed this
to the elephant in the room. I was not cognizant that judges were as aware of this as their
responses indicated. The data indicates that this is a primary concern for judges in cases of CSA,
which also alleviates some of my uncertainly around testifying. The literature did not address
this issue directly. There was much discussion of what to include in testimony (Grove & Barden,
1999; Piper, 2008; Murrie et al., 2009), what the rules are (Grove & Barden, 1999), how to
decide what type of witness you are (Ceci & Hembrooke, 2002; Piper, 2008; Steinhauser, 2002),
and some mention of the significance to the child (Snow et al., 2004), but nothing I saw that so
clearly spoke to the need for MHP courage. This clarifies for me the reason to go into battle; the
reason to be willing to embrace this challenge. As one participant put it, “It‟s too important not
to.”
Helping the child is another subtheme of the credibility theme. It was very gratifying to
see that each of these participants kept their focus on what was in the child‟s best interest
throughout. This idea was present to such an extent that any pause on the part of the participant
resolved itself by a return to what was in the child‟s best interest. The participant comments
indicated that they would also appreciate being able to view MHPs as on the same team. Perhaps
they perceived us in a slightly elephantine way as well. They wanted unbiased, non-suggestive

115

information about what had happened to the child, and what would minimize the impact of the
trauma for the child.
Experiential Perspective
The experiential perspective theme represents judicial comments regarding specific cases
that the participants chose to mention. This theme is significant because it represents the similar
experiences that the judges had, which helps to tease out the data most helpful for MHPs in cases
of CSA. There were no subthemes within this theme, mainly because the comments were all
reflective of personal experience, and breaking the comments down lessened the impact of the
data. These comments were strengthened by maintaining them within the context as a whole.
The main similarity is that four of the five participants mentioned specific MHPs by name. The
fifth participant mentioned organizations with which the jurisdiction was familiar, but did not
mention anyone by name. Again, the participants wanted to be certain that the MHP was not
biased, and that the evidence offered was reliable.
The experiential perspective theme indicates that the participants were, to some degree,
aware of the complications that can exist for MHPs in this area, but continued to focus on the
child and the importance of making a valid decision for that child‟s best interest. The literature
discussed the importance of effective assessments (Dent & Newton, 1994; Kuehnle, 1998), and
that is in keeping with what this data indicates. The negative comments made by the participants
were all in relation to bias, or “hired guns” and the examples of negative experiences revolved
around what were described as ineffective assessments. The positive comments all were
reflective of effective assessments, in which a thorough investigation was done, to include either
the alleged perpetrator, or at least one outside third party. The participants also made it clear
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that when it came to balancing the child‟s rights against those of the parent, that the child‟s rights
would take precedence, particularly in County/Youth Court.
The significance of this theme lies in the clear battle plan that it reveals. MHPs involved
in cases of CSA should be thorough and objective. All the literature regarding effective
assessments of CSA was in keeping with what the participants reported they wanted from MHP
testimony. This helps me, as a MHP in CSA cases, in that I will not feel hesitant to contact other
attorneys, GALs, or others in a position to help me get an accurate picture of the child‟s
situation. This theme is also significant in that it highlights the fact that the participant
awareness of the differences between forensic evaluations and therapeutic assessments is not as
keen as we might like.
Operational
The operational theme is significant to the judicial perception of MHPs in cases of CSA,
because it outlines the parameters that exist within the system and teaches us the rules of the
game. There were no subthemes within this theme either, for the reason that the data lost its
significance when broken down. The appointment of GALs was the major similarity here. The
literature discussed the importance of the rules of evidence as they applied to the admission of
therapeutic evidence (Grove & Barden, 1999; Murrie et al., 2009), as did the participants of this
study, who discussed the importance of the need for the techniques to be non-suggestive and
accepted within the field.
One unexpected response was that the more experienced participants seemed to have a
proprietary feeling regarding their role in relation to the child. The participants expressed
resentment in relation to anything that was perceived as interfering with their ability to make a
clear decision about what is in the best interests of the child. This is very significant.
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Participation in CSA cases can often feel like such a contentious experience, but this response
highlights the need for MHPs to cultivate working relationships with the actors in this system. It
also makes it clear that MHPs need to remember that the judge is also on the side of the child,
because the data makes it clear that they see themselves as the “super guardian” of the children
before their courts.
Participant comments that reflected the need for MHP evidence to meet the standards
outlined by the literature were prevalent (Crawford v. Washington, 2004; Grove & Barden, 1999;
Murrie, et al., 2009). The evidence should be admitted it if it were “approved;” “taught;” “tried
and true;” “documented as adequate, reliable therapy;” “accepted in the field;” “not suggestive;”
helpful in leading to a “justifiable medical opinion;” or if it “works.” The MHP was encouraged
to “use all the tools in the tool chest;” “use everything within their power.” These comments
indicate that the real world of this phenomenon matches the ideal world as it is described in the
literature.
Implications
The implications of this research are numerous. There are policy implications that could
direct MHP involvement in courtrooms at a systemic level, research implications that could add
more understanding to the interaction of judges, MHPs and CSA, and practice implications that
could help individual MHPs in their decision making regarding involvement with CSA cases,
both in and out of court. The participant population was small, but the comments reached
saturation, which lends credibility to the study. Trustworthiness is established through the
consistency with the literature, disclosure of all researcher bias, consultation with an external
auditor, option of a member check, and disclosure of all outlying data. The participants were
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varied enough to be reflective of the population, with a mix of genders, races, geographical
locations, and court jurisdictions.
One notable aspect was the time of interviews. Each interview was between eighteen and
twenty-two minutes. The brevity of the interviews could be seen as a weakness. I believe it to
be an indication of the effectiveness of the interview questions, in conjunction with the
population interviewed. Patton (2002) discusses the qualitative researcher‟s need to decide
between breadth or depth, saying
the extent to which a research or evaluation study is broad or narrow depends on purpose,
the resources available, the time available, and the interests of those involved. In brief,
these are not choices between good and bad, but choices among alternatives, all of which
have merit.” (p. 228)
In this study, the purpose was singularly focused on the judicial perception of MHPs in court.
There was some thought given to the need not to inconvenience the participants any more than
necessary. The questions elicited the data I was seeking, and therefore the answers were
efficiently communicated. The population of judges are accustomed to succinct communication
as well, and therefore, refrained from including extraneous information in their responses. The
fact that they were able to complete the interviews in such a similar amount of time can lend
credibility to the interview questions.
Policy Implications
The policy implications of this research indicate a need for a platform for MHPs to
communicate with the legal system. There are also implications that help to define the role that
MHPs should play in the public advocacy for a more streamlined approach to CSA cases, the
need for educating the legal system more directly on the differences between forensic
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evaluations and therapeutic assessments, to push for court appointments, and for MHPs to cease
communication with parents once courts become involved.
There is awareness on the part of MHPs, in my experience, that it is preferable to be
appointed by a court in cases of CSA. Each of my participants made reference to this same idea,
and yet it is not policy. When both MHPs and judges are aware that court appointment is
preferred, why would this not be policy? A regular policy of appointing MHPs would help
eliminate so many of the issues for both MHPs and the judges in this study. The bias that the
judges mentioned so frequently, the confusion on the part of MHPs as to what role they are to
fill, both of these major issues would be eradicated by the regular court appointment of MHPs in
cases of CSA.
There is also the emerging issue that the judges in this study are not fully aware of the
difference between a therapeutic assessment and a forensic evaluation. This is another area in
which a communication platform between MHPs and the legal system could increase the
effectiveness of MHP involvement in court. The literature directed at MHPs makes it clear that
it is an ethical responsibility of MHPs to know and understand what a forensic evaluation is, and
be trained to administer these before we endeavor to do so. The participant comments
underscore that they are not MHPs, and that they rely on us to give them reliable information.
The assessment of whether a child has or has not been sexually abused is inherently complicated,
as the literature shows. The implications of the results of a therapeutic assessment versus a
forensic evaluation, are, therefore, very significant. For this reason it is imperative that the legal
system understand the difference more clearly.
This is exactly in keeping with the participant comments related to the question of
advocacy. Here is where MHPs need to be more publicly direct, and as Nelson (1998) said,
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speak openly. To ascertain that the judicial system understands the difference between a forensic
evaluation and a therapeutic assessment could lead to the development of a policy in which the
court appoints a GAL (Judge Bush emphasized that this should already be happening in
Mississippi), who then seeks out and retains a forensic evaluation of the child. This could
eliminate much confusion. MHPs that treat and see the child could then be free to testify as fact
witnesses, but would not be required to harm the therapeutic relationship by having to change
roles and become more investigator than therapist. The results of this study indicate that all of
the judges in this study would be open to this idea, and that some even think that this is what
already happens. The only thing missing is the awareness of the subtle differences between a
thorough forensic evaluation as opposed to a therapeutic assessment.
Another policy implication is to specify that once a court is involved in a case of CSA,
the MHP would no longer communicate with the parents of the child, but would instead
communicate with the court, possibly through a GAL. The data indicated that this potential issue
creates a question for judges regarding the objectivity of MHPs. Adopting a policy such as this
would decrease the appearance of possible bias, and increase the ability of the MHP to remain
objective. Anything less than a systematic adoption of this policy, however, would be less
effective than each individual MHP‟s adoption of the same policy. This is another way in which
MHPs could advocate for our clients by suggesting this as policy.
One participant often referred to needing to be on the same page. I thought this
participant felt the same way as I did, namely that both MHPs and judges were in the same room,
but on the opposite side of some great divide. The public advocacy and leadership aspect of the
counseling profession could serve as the platform on which we cross this divide, and go, once
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more, into the breach together. There can be little doubt that this would be a more effective
approach for the children victims of CSA.
Implications for Practice
At the outset of this study, I wanted the outcome to include increased clarity for MHPs
who participate in cases of CSA in court. I hope that the results of this study can help MHPs feel
less insecure about participating on behalf of their child clients who have been victims of any
type of abuse. The overall attitude indicates how important our involvement is. The participants
indicate that MHPs need to be more aware of the legal system, and how to use it to our best
advantage. The overall attitude was very much in keeping with the analogy of a battlefield. The
need for MHPs to be, as one participant put it, “willing to embrace” this role; to be willing to suit
up and enter the fray boldly is clear.
The complexities created on this battlefield, however, are significant. For this reason, I
would suggest, based on the results of this study that MHPs undertake the following actions
when involved in any case that might end up in court.
First, I think that all MHPs have to develop a courtroom action plan as part of their
philosophy of practice. This should include a determination of what type of witness a MHP is
willing to be, as well as what type of witness a MHP is qualified to be. This would include
whether they are willing to participate as a fact witness, an expert witness, a forensic evaluator,
or any combination of these. It would also include the MHP‟s determination of how they will
balance all these possible roles. For one example, if the MHP role in a particular case is to be a
forensic evaluator they might specify that they will not participate in a therapeutic manner. The
literature indicates the importance of this, the judicial comments underscore this, but the need to
intentionally outline this on an individual MHP basis has not been implemented fully in practice.
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It is as if some of us avoid this, and determine to address it on a case by case basis. This is not
effective. So often our cases take shape only after we have become involved. It is too late at that
point to objectively make the determination as to how you will address court involvement. It is
becoming more common for MHPs to include information about how court involvement will be
handled within the client‟s informed consent, but I would suggest that this go further, and MHPs
be encouraged to philosophically determine the parameters of their willingness to be involved in
court as an operational matter. There are many aspects of court involvement that MHPs cannot
control. A court subpoena cannot be ignored. Still, MHPs can control what type of witness they
are willing to be, but in order to do this, there first needs to be an understanding by the MHP of
the different types of witnesses. I think often MHPs who are not planning to be involved in court
do not take this seriously, but again, our profession is such that we cannot predict with perfect
accuracy when or where we might be called to court.
The next step would be, and often already is, the inclusion of how court involvement will
impact the therapeutic relationship within the informed consent to the client. This will increase
the clarity of the relationship for all parties. It can also serve as a tool to uncover potential
ulterior motives on the part of the parent. Judicial comments indicated that this was a concern,
and the judges were not confident that MHPs were aware of the possibility that parents might try
to manipulate us. If MHPs fully articulate the limits of their policy regarding court involvement,
the plan of a parent secretly coaching a child might be thwarted before it has even been
implemented. A MHP who states clearly that they are only willing to be involved in a
therapeutic manner, clearly stating that they are not qualified as a forensic evaluator, might end
the relationship with a referral, as opposed to spending months in the confusing morass of a case.
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This too, is better for the child. A parent who “shops” for a therapist is creating an evidentiary
trail that will speak for itself.
I also would suggest that MHPs include in their informed consent that once there is court
involvement, the MHP will no longer communicate with the parents without court order. One of
the issues that judges most often have is concern over bias on the part of the MHP in favor of one
parent or the other. In Mississippi, the requirement of the appointment of a GAL for the child
creates an opportunity for the MHP to avoid the mine field of battling parents, by using the GAL
as an unbiased representative for the child. This is in fact, one of the roles a GAL is often called
on to perform. The data also indicated that the judges in this study would completely understand
and be in support of MHPs talking more directly to the court.
After the MHP has developed their philosophy of courtroom approach, and included the
operation of this within their informed consent, they can then take the next step in an effective
courtroom plan. If the MHP has determined that he or she will only participate in court as a fact
witness, then the plan is complete. If not, if the MHP is courageously willing to embrace
involvement in court, the MHP should begin to gain knowledge about their system. This
includes what jurisdictions handle what types of cases, what rules of evidence apply, and
primarily, who the system participants are. The judicial comments in this data indicate that all of
these are important things for MHPs to know. Knowing the system can go so far in helping to
alleviate the confusion MHPs feel when called to court. The time it takes to familiarize yourself
with both the rules of your particular court, as well as the people who run it, can be invaluable in
your being able to use the system to the best advantage of your client. The data indicated that,
even though each judge wanted objective facts, awareness of the judge‟s personal idiosyncrasies
could be helpful in determining how to best present these facts. This is not surprising, as
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attorneys utilize their knowledge of judges to develop their cases, and even my mother reported
using the same technique in her case presentations for the Mississippi Department of Human
Services (MDHS). MHPs need to get on this page, which requires that we intentionally involve
ourselves in this system. This can also help in advocacy for our clients, in that we become a
known entity, no longer an outsider to this well-defined system. Assuming effectiveness on the
part of the MHP, being willing to actively contact the GAL, DHS, the judge, or whomever your
knowledge indicates as the most effective party, can go a long way toward case resolution,
possibly without court involvement.
MHPs need to make use of the players within their own battlefield. Being actively
involved by contacting attorneys, GALs, teachers, judges, DHS workers, is one area in which the
judges wished we were more active. I don‟t think the importance of this can be overstated.
Being actively involved with this system can help on so many levels. It can lead to the system‟s
increased use of court appointment, can increase the system‟s awareness of the importance of
forensic evaluations, can help clarify the MHP role, can indicate that the MHP needs to educate
about that role, and can generally increase the clarity around what is actually happening with the
child. The silence surrounding abuse is often referred to as a reason for its continuation. The
compartmentalization of information around a case of CSA has much the same impact.
Removing those barriers between those on the CSA battle field can increase our effectiveness in
individual cases.
The final suggestion I would make for MHPs willing to embrace court involvement, is
actually one that should be throughout. MHPs must know the role they are to play, and be
prepared to maintain that role. One aspect of this data was that judges want MHPs to be
investigators, which is not a role we typically play, except as forensic evaluators. MHPs need to
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be intentionally aware of this, such that we are not tempted to cross the line. Both the data and
the literature indicate that MHP crossing of lines in cases of CSA leads to problems. Educating
judges on the differences between forensic evaluations and therapeutic assessments might serve
to alleviate this issue.
Another aspect of knowing our role is to remember to let the judge be the judge. A
possible occupational hazard for MHPs is the constant analysis of, well, everything. This can
sometimes lead to paralysis in action because of assumptions that have been made regarding
possible outcomes. MHPs need to allow the judge to do his or her job, and this means open
candidness. This might include educating the judge on the different roles we play, especially
forensic evaluation versus therapeutic assessment. The MHP also needs to keep in mind that
judges perceive themselves as “super guardians” for children, and will resent any attempt at our
trying to usurp that responsibility.
An issue in this same vein that came out of this data was one of trust. It felt to me, as I
talked to the judges, that they wanted to trust us, but were not sure they could. At the same time,
as a MHP, I was on the other side, wanting to trust them, but not sure that I could. I now think
that I can trust the judge to be the judge. I also see that effective involvement in court indicates
that I must. Hesitating to be open and candid about the information I have regarding a case is
akin to using silence to allow abuse to continue. This is of course, the heart of the fear we feel as
MHPs, because of the great risk to our clients, our reputation, our licensure and our way of life.
But surely, it is also, at least in part, the reason we do what we do. Protecting clients, especially
children, is certainly part of why I do what I do. I want to be a courageous MHP, bloodied,
perhaps, but valiantly fighting to protect children from the great devastation of abuse.
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Implications for Research
The implications for further research include: the possibility of increasing the awareness
of the emotional reaction of judges and how this impacts the outcome of CSA cases; a more
thorough evaluation of the CSA process effect implicated by this research; and a continued
exploration of the strange reaction to the issue of children‟s rights in conjunction with society‟s
reaction to child abuse. There is also possible research regarding the differences in attitude
between the Chancellors and the County/Youth Court Judges, as well as the attitude of
resentment that the judges may have in relation to anyone perceived as keeping them from doing
what was in the best interests of the child.
Having a deeper understanding of the impact of judicial emotions on CSA cases could
serve as a microcosm of current societal attitudes toward CSA. The emotions present in the
participant responses to this interview were interesting, but not the goal of this research. In fact,
the questions were designed to minimize any emotional response. The emotions were still
present, however, and I think it would be of great import to understand how the experience of
being a judge presiding over cases of CSA impacted the fulfillment of that duty. The more
experienced judges in this study had more pronounced responses, and did seem to have issues
related to specific experiences borne of their own courtrooms.
This is very close to the process effect, as described by Michrina and Richards (1996). I
think the subtle but important difference is that the CSA process effect would include the
possible impact of becoming numb to CSA, as well as how the continued utilization of the
system itself impacts the process of justice. This might be significant not only for MHPs
working in the legal system, but for the legal system as well. The furtherance of justice, a lofty
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ideal, is limited by human frailty. Understanding how this phenomenon impacts the justice
system could conceivably lead to more objectivity.
Another area for possible future research is to continue research in the societal reaction to
the issue of children‟s rights, and how this interacts with society‟s attitude toward sexual abuse.
I had expected, when I started the literature review on children‟s rights that there would be a
clear description of these rights. As the literature review points out, however, it was anything
but. I also expected that judges who were accustomed to dealing with children‟s issues in court
would have an understanding of children‟s rights. This was also not true. The literature
discusses the development of children‟s rights (Fetzer & Houlgate, 1997; Mason, 2005), and how
this interacts with society‟s view of children (Simon, 2000), and how both of these interact with
society‟s approach to child abuse (Dodds, 2006). This issue does seem to exist for the judges in
this study as well. Research to deepen the understanding of how this directs the manner in which
we work to eradicate child abuse might reveal new avenues for advocacy.
The differences in attitude between the Chancellors and the County/Youth Court Judges
are also a possible area for future research. Understanding the precursors for this difference
could be useful. There are many possible reasons for the difference, including that
County/Youth Court Judges have more discretion, and the cases in their courts are confidential.
As one participant put it, “In Youth Court, it‟s a different animal.” This could allow for more
effective outcomes in CSA cases, but the possible interaction between the greater discretion and
the CSA process effect might lead to potential bias on the part of the judge. The difference in
attitude between the judges in this study who had been County/Youth Court Judges and those
that had not could be an indicator of a potential issue.
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The most experienced judges in this study had an interesting reaction regarding anything
perceived as interfering with their duty toward the child. This is comforting for a MHP who
works with children, and interesting from a research perspective. What creates that bond? Is this
a paternal type reaction, or a source of professional pride? Does it only exist, as it did in this
study, for the judges with County/Youth Court experience, or possibly only in relation to
children who have been abused? This could be a reflection of the effectiveness of the
County/Youth Court system in Mississippi, in that the purpose of these courts is to protect
children. This reaction indicates that the judges, in cases of CSA, should be seen as the general,
as it were, on the battlefield. Understanding this phenomenon would be of great interest.
Conclusion
As previously mentioned, the beginning of this project was just an inkling of an idea that
there was an elephant in the room with those of us involved in cases of CSA, and the need to
expose that elephant in order to be more effective soldiers in the battle to protect children. The
outcome is that the knowledge that we assumed we knew about how judges perceived MHPs is
clearer. The data indicates that the judicial perception of MHPs involved in cases of CSA is
much as we might expect. The depth added through the interviews indicates that there is much
to be gained by a more intentional connection between the legal community and the community
of MHPs, especially when it comes to the issue of sexual abuse.
For the continued purpose of full disclosure of the researcher lens, I hope that the data in
this study will be utilized by other MHPs. I believe that it can, in that the vague unnamed fear
that I felt regarding involvement in court has dissipated. In the mental health community, we
often are aware of the need for disclosure and open communication, and how these things lead to
the resolution of problems and more effective involvement in life. It is also often a lack of trust
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borne of experience that inhibits disclosure and open communication. It is interesting to me that
these are the very issues that comprise my elephant. The experiences of both judges who preside
over cases of CSA, and MHPs who have been involved in courtrooms leads to a general lack of
trust that impedes us both. Knowledge of the boundaries, rules and requirements of this welldefined system can go a long way toward alleviating this fear, and reestablishing trust between
judges and MHPs. Perhaps, one day, there will be MHPs among us who will consider
themselves accursed that they were not beside us on this battlefield. I hope that the knowledge
gained through this study will lead to MHPs being more willing to boldly entry the fray. Again,
it is too important for anything less.
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Judge _____,
My name is Lynn Etheridge, and I am a doctoral student in the Leadership
and Counselor Education department at The University of Mississippi, working
on my dissertation.
My project is a qualitative one, with the stated purpose of exploring and
describing the requirements that judges in Mississippi perceive regarding
the introduction of mental health evidence in cases of child sexual abuse.
To work toward this purpose, I would like to interview you, in an open-ended
confidential interview, which might take 30 minutes of your time. The
collected data will then be analyzed to help mental health professionals better
prepare for testimony in court cases involving child sexual abuse.

My project has been approved by The Institutional Review Board at The
University of Mississippi. The IRB has determined that this study fulfills the
human research subject protections obligations required by state and federal law
and University policies. If you have any questions, concerns, or reports regarding
your rights as a participant of research, please contact the IRB at (662)
915-7482.
Dr. Marilyn Snow at The University of Mississippi is the Faculty member
overseeing my project.

If you would be willing to be interviewed, or have any questions, please reply
to this email, or call me at, and I will schedule you for an
interview or answer any questions you have.

Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter,
S. Lynn Etheridge, JD, MSCP, LPC, RPT-S
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CONSENT FORM
Consent to Participate in an Experimental Study
Title: The role of Mental Health Professionals in cases of child sexual abuse as seen through the
eyes of judges
Investigator
S. Lynn Etheridge, JD, LPC, RPT.
Department of Leadership and Counselor
Education
117 Guyton Hall
The University of Mississippi

Sponsor
Marilyn S. Snow, PhD.
Department of Leadership and Counselor
Education
108 Guyton Hall
The University of Mississippi
(662) 915-1363

Description
We want to how judges perceive the roles that mental health professionals perform in cases of
child sexual abuse. In order to answer our question, we are asking you to take part in a short
interview with the primary investigator. The questions are open ended, and you will be allowed
to make any comments that you would like. The interview will likely only last for 30 minutes.
Risks and Benefits
There is no risk involved in this study except for your valuable time. There is no direct benefit to
you, however, the results of this study may help mental health professionals to more effectively
participate in cases of child sexual abuse.
Cost and Payments
The interview will take approximately 30 minutes, and you will be given an opportunity to
review the interviewer‟s summary of the interview at a later time, which might take 15 minutes.
There are no other costs for helping with this study.
Confidentiality
The interviews will be taped and transcribed, but there will be no association of your name or
any other identifying information with the transcript of the interview. Therefore, we do not
believe that you can be identified from any participation in this study.
Right to Withdraw
You do not have to take part in this study. If you start the study and decide that you do not want
to finish, all you have to do is to tell S. Lynn Etheridge or Dr. Marilyn Snow in person, by letter,
or by telephone at the Department of Leadership and Counselor Education, 117 Guyton Hall,
Hall, The University of Mississippi, University MS 38677, or 662-915-7069. Whether or not
you choose to participate or to withdraw will not affect your standing with the Department of
Leadership and Counselor Education, or with the University, and it will not cause you to lose any
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benefits to which you are entitled. Inducements, if any, will be prorated based on [the amount of
time you spent in the study.]
The researchers may terminate your participation in the study without regard to your consent and
for any reason, such as protecting your safety and protecting the integrity of the research data. If
the researcher terminates your participation, any inducements to participate will be prorated
based on the amount of time you spent in the study.
IRB Approval
This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi‟s Institutional Review Board
(IRB). The IRB has determined that this study fulfills the human research subject protections
obligations required by state and federal law and University policies. If you have any questions,
concerns, or reports regarding your rights as a participant of research, please contact the IRB at
(662) 915-7482.
Statement of Consent
I have read the above information. I have been given a copy of this form. I have had an
opportunity to ask questions, and I have received answers. I consent to participate in the study.

Signature of Participant

Date

Signature of Investigator

Date
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Judge _____,
As a reminder, we had an interview in ____regarding your perception of mental
health professional testimony in court cases regarding child sexual abuse.

I am beginning the analysis part of my research, and wanted to offer you the
opportunity to review a summary of our interview. It is not necessary, but if
you would like to review a summary let me know, and I will forward a summary of
our interview to you.

I want to thank you again for taking the time to allow me to interview you. I
am excited about beginning this next phase of the project, and your willingness
to participate helped make that possible, so thank you.
S. Lynn Etheridge, JD, MSCP, LPC, RPT-S
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Summary of interview
This participant indicated that the role of a mental health professional in court was to adequately
investigate and assess the level of harm, if any to the child. The judge specified the differences
between fact and expert witnesses, and mentioned a particular mental health professional‟s
conduct relating to a court proceeding that was particularly effective. There was also mention
of the necessity of balancing confidentiality against the necessity to give the court the
information needed to make a valid decision. It was also important that the mental health
professional be aware of their role, and to maintain that role, as to fact or expert witness.
The judge mentioned that it was preferable to have someone who did not feel overly cautious
about reporting information to the court, and this was one reason, in addition to legal
requirements, that a Guardian ad Litem might be appointed. The Guardian ad Litem was also
described as someone who also might assist in advocating for the child‟s rights. The participant
felt that custody issues sometimes led to situations in which a child‟s privacy interests might be
violated, and the judge described procedures followed to mitigate this.
The judge stated that it was important for the mental health professional to interview all parties,
and to get all sides. The judge mentioned the natural parent presumption. The judge stated that
a suspected perpetrator/parent‟s rights might not change, but that being a suspected perpetrator
would certainly have an impact on a case. The judge‟s approach to parental rights was that
everyone was on a level playing field to begin, and that if it seemed that a parent might be
moving toward self-incrimination, the judge would take steps either to protect the parent‟s fifth
amendment rights, or, when necessary, the child. The judge took the approach that each case
should be decided on its own merits, while keeping the best interests of the child in the forefront.
The judge reported that it was important for mental health professionals to maintain their
professionalism and integrity, and that their credibility would not necessarily be impacted if they
publicly advocated for children, or against child abuse. The judge stated that public advocacy
might even be an attribute.
The judge did not think that the use of Play Therapy would lessen the credibility of a mental
health professional, as long as it was a “tried and true” method. This also should be decided on a
case by case basis.
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